arch/ive/ief (2000 - 2005)

Verontrustend.
Heeft iemand trouwens het electronisch stemmen ok zo in detail geanalyseerd bij de laatste belgische verkiezingen?

Misschien ook interessant:
de website van de OSCE (organisatie voor veiligheid en samenwerking in europa)
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/field_activities/?election=2004us

Hieronder een stukje hieruit uit hun 'Needs Assessment Mission report' over 'voting technology' bij de presidentsverkiezingen.



E. VOTING TECHNOLOGY
The voters in the United States cast their votes using a range of equipment which may vary not
only from state to state, but also from county to county within a state. Five different voting
technologies may be in use in a particular state. These typically include lever and punch-card
machines, paper ballots, optical scan and electronic machines such as touch-screens (directrecording
electronic or DREs).
After the problems experienced during the 2000 elections in Florida and other parts of the
country with relation to punch-card equipment, the reform of voting technology was given a
central role in HAVA, which established a separate fund to replace punch-card devices with
other voting equipment. The new equipment has to meet HAVA requirements, such as to
notify a voter of an over-vote (voting for more than one option on one ballot), allow voters
with disabilities to cast votes in secrecy and allow language minority voters to cast ballots in
their own language.
According to HAVA, the states should replace their outdated voting machines by equipment
that satisfies the requirements of HAVA by 1 January 2006. Although the replacement of
punch-card machines is not mandatory, the states that choose to continue voting with punch
cards may not be eligible to receive relevant HAVA funds. The lever and punch-card
2 November 2004 Elections Page: 8
United States of America
OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report, 7 – 10 September 2004
machines will still be in use in almost half of the states during the upcoming November 2004
elections.
In general, the nationwide replacement of voting equipment, inspired by the disputes witnessed
during the 2000 elections, primarily in Florida, may potentially become a source of even
greater controversy during the forthcoming elections. This is particularly the case as the results
are projected to be close in some states. A majority of new DRE machines do not produce the
necessary paper trail of votes needed for a manual recount of votes, which is envisioned in
many state laws and required in certain cases in the event of very close outcomes. In addition,
the software used in DREs has not been a subject of independent domestic public scrutiny,
which has already raised questions among election stakeholders as to the reliability of the
equipment and protection against unauthorized interference. As in the case of provisional
ballots, it is also expected that DREs may cause post-election disputes and litigation,
potentially delaying the announcement of final results.
Due to its delayed appointment, the EAC has not been able to publish voting system
guidelines, which would include minimum security measures required from the new
equipment; nor has the National Institute for Standards and Technology been able to set the
conditions for certification of such machines. Instead, some states adopted their own standards
while others have not.
Confidence in the new electronic equipment was further affected after media reports on
political activities of DREs vendors, such as financial contributions to political campaigns, and
in particular after the public statement of the CEO of one of the main vendors that he would
help to deliver votes to one of the candidates.