arch/ive/ief (2000 - 2005)

Saddam Behind Anthrax Attacks?
by Ernst Blofeld Friday, Jan. 02, 2004 at 4:32 PM

The tantalizing information from David Kay in Iraq is further explored below in Cliff Kincaid's "Saddam Behind Anthrax Attacks?". Unfortunately Kay does not give us enough information to make any real connection between Iraq and the 2001 anthrax. He simply says Iraq had the technology to make an anthrax aerosol, but he doesn't say if this was the same silica/siloxane binder technology that was used in the Daschle anf Leahy anthrax. There are only a few specific siloxane componds that could be used to process anthrax spores (we are not going to reveal them in this forum). Some journalist needs to re-interview Kay (who is now back in the US) and ask him if Iraq used siloxanes as binders.

http://www.aim.org/publications/media_monitor/2004/01/01.html

Saddam Behind Anthrax Attacks?
By Cliff Kincaid
January 1, 2004



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In a major development, potentially as significant as the capture of Saddam Hussein, investigative journalist Richard Miniter says there is evidence to indicate Saddam’s anthrax program was capable of producing the kind of anthrax that hit America shortly after 9/11. Miniter, author of Losing bin Laden, told Accuracy in Media that during November he interviewed U.S. weapons inspector Dr. David Kay in Baghdad and that he was "absolutely shocked and astonished" at the sophistication of the Iraqi program.

Miniter said that Kay told him that, "the Iraqis had developed new techniques for drying and milling anthrax—techniques that were superior to anything the United States or the old Soviet Union had. That would make the former regime of Saddam Hussein the most sophisticated manufacturer of anthrax in the world." Miniter said there are "intriguing similarities" between the nature of the anthrax that could be produced by Saddam and what hit America after 9/11. The key similarity is that the anthrax is produced in such a way that "hangs in the air much longer than anthrax normally would" and is therefore more lethal.

Nevertheless, the FBI has been operating on the assumption that it was produced by a disgruntled American scientist, perhaps in a basement. The FBI wasted hundreds of thousands of dollars investigating the possibility that the anthrax letters were packaged underwater in a Maryland pond in a special device of some sort.

In a development that has received little media attention, an article in the November 28th issue of Science magazine focuses on the testimony of experts that the nature of the anthrax used against America constituted a major advance in biological weapons technology. The article notes that analysts in the U.S. Army detected silica coatings on the anthrax sent to the U.S. Senate and that special chemicals were used to enhance its ability to form a lethal aerosol. One of those was a super-specialized binder chemical used to keep the silica particles in place on the surface of the spores.

One of the experts quoted in the article told us that, "In my opinion it would be impossible to manufacture a powder like this without state-sponsorship… These are super-specialized areas—and once it is understood just how difficult it is to process powders with these coatings, it becomes immediately obvious that only a highly disciplined state-sponsored program could have achieved this."

Many reports in the media, including Washington Post reporter Marilyn Thompson’s book on the anthrax attacks, have claimed that the Ames strain of anthrax used in the attacks was a U.S. "military strain" and was therefore probably made in the U.S. But experts say the Ames strain was provided to laboratories around the world. The expert told us that, "Far too much focus has been placed on the genetic and DNA analysis of the senate anthrax" which has identified it as the Ames strain. "The real key to finding out who did it is not the DNA analysis, but the analysis of the coatings that were used." He said David Kay should be looking for scientists in Iraq who have developed this technology.

No, he's not -- Zawahiri is
by Ross Friday, Jan. 02, 2004 at 5:19 PM

I Summary and Introduction
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/#Summary

II. Means: Al Qaeda's Biochem Program  
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/#Means

a. The Vanguards of Conquest and Zawahiri's Decade-Long Quest to Weaponize Anthrax
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/#Decade%20Long%20Quest

b. Separating the Wheat Germ from the Ricin
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/#Ricin

c. Anthrax Production Documents on Khalid Mohammed's Computer
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/#Anthrax%20Production%20Program

d. Hambali and the Role of Anthrax Lab Technician Yazid Sufaat
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/#Lab%20Tech%20Sufaat

e. Association of Various Doctors with Senior Al Qaeda Operatives
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/#Association%20Doctors

f. Distribution of the Ames Strain
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/#Ames%20Distribution

g. Method Used to Weaponize the Anthrax
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/#Method%20to%20Weaponize

h. The Canadian September 2001 Report: "Risk Assessment of Anthrax Threat Letters"
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/#Canadian9/2001Report

i. Atta's Travels to Prague and the Alleged Iraq Connection
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/#Atta's%20Travels%20to%20Prague

j. Inquiries About Crop dusters and "Operation Tripwire"
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Cropdusters

k. Hijacker Ahmed's Blackened Leg Lesion
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#LegLesion

l. Atta's Red Hands and Al Qaeda's Interest in and Use of the Detergent Saponin in Weaponizing Biochem Agents
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Atta'sRedHands

m. Moazzam Begg: The Confession About An Anthrax Plot Involving A Drone Over London
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Drone

III. Motive: The Reason Senators Leahy and Daschle and the Media Were Targeted

a. Profile of an Angry Man: Ayman
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Motive

b. FBI's Profile
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Profile

c. The Historical Significance of the Mailing Dates to Zawahiri :
The Camp David Accord and the Assassination of Anwar Sadat
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Mailing%20Dates

d. The "Leahy Law" and Appropriations to Military and Security Units
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Leahy%20Law

e. Zawahiri's View of the "Lies" of the Secular Media
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Secular%20Media

f. Greendale School at Franklin Park: The Return to Fort Lauderdale and 9/11
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Greendale%20School

g. Jennifer Lopez Letter and Atta's Jenny Code
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#JLoLetterandJennyCode

IV. Modus Operandi: Pouring Musk on Barren Land
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#PouringMuskonBarrenLand

a. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad MO: The Targeted Assassination of Individuals in Symbolic Positions
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#TargetedAssassination

b. Zawahiri's Victory in the EIJ Internal Debate Over Whether to Focus on US or Egyptian Targets
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#USversusEgyptiantargets

c. Egyptian Islamists' Earlier WTC Letter Bombs to Washington, DC and New York City Newspapers
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#EarlierWTCBombs

d. Continuing Practice of Sending Poisonous Letters as Threats
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#ContinuingPractice

V. Opportunity: Tracking Potential Al Qaeda or Egyptian Islamic Jihad or Islamic Group Sleepers
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#TrackingSleepers

a. Know Not Just Your Enemy, But Who He Knew: Zawahiri's Travels to the US
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Zawahiri'sTravelsToUS

b. Balancing the Scales
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#BalancingTheScales

c. The 911 Detainees
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#911Detainees

d. Jaffar The Pilot And The Threat Looming On The Horizon
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#JaffarThePilot

e. Adham Hassoun: The Blind Sheik Follower Who Saw No Evil
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Hassoun

f. The Man In The Library Researching Anthrax
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#ManInTheLibrary

g. Mohamed Mansour Jabarah: The Go-Between Between Karachi and Kuala Lumpur
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Jabarah

h. Nabil Al-Marabh: The Cabbie Who Knew His Way Around
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#al-Marabh

i. Jaber Elbaneh : The Man From Buffalo Worth $5 Million
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#Elbaneh

j. The Syracuse Charity Case and "Operation Imminent Horizon"
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#SyracuseCharityCase

k. Al-Marri: Majored in Computer Studies, Minored in Dangerous Chemicals
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#al-Marri

l. Syed Athar Abbas and the Fort Lee, New Jersey $100,000 Food Processor
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#SyedAtharAbbas

m. The Canadian Detainees: Guilt By Association
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/Page2.html#CanadianDetainees

n. The Mason In Charge Of Building A Case
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#Mason%20Building%20A%20Case

VI. "Hatfill Theory": Another Jewell In The Rough
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#Hatfill

a. "Mr. Z": A "Person of Interest"
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#

b. Greendale School: Where the 4th "R" Stands For Railroading
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#Greendale

c. The Investigation Goes to the Dogs
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#InvestigationGoestoDogs

d. Little Man By The Window Stood
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#Little%20Man%20By%20Window

e. A Novel Approach To Warning About Bioterrorism
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#NovelApproach

f. Muckraking: Don't Jus' Keep Wishin', Go Fishin'
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#MuckrakingFishing

g. Reading the Handwriting on the Wall
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#Readinghandwritingonwall

h. No Time To Kill
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#NoTimetoKill

i The Investigation of the Mock-Up and Mocking of an Investigation
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#Mock-up

j. Hatfill's Day In Court
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#DayInCourt

Conclusion
http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze43v8m/alqaeda,anthrax,.html#Conclusion

Did Livermore have Ames?
by Ross Saturday, Jan. 03, 2004 at 12:15 AM


http://www.llnl.gov/llnl/06news/NewsReleases/2003/NR-03-12-05.html

Comment:

Did a Northern Arizona lab provide the Ames anthrax strain to the Lawrence Livermore lab ?

According to the evidence from a trial in Egypt in 1999, Bin Laden first arranged to purchase anthrax through the Moro Islamic Liberation Front ("MILF"). In light of the detention by Philippine authorities of a former HVAC technician, Michael Ray Stubbs, with top-level security clearance from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California -- because of alleged contacts with MILF leaders -- the question of his access to sensitive information and materials arises.

Did that lab have the virulent Ames strain that was used in the anthrax attacks in the Fall of 2001?

According to an Environmental Assessment relating to a proposed BL-3 lab there, the lab has worked with "a number" of different strains since the Spring of 2000. One on-line account, quoting a "Frequently Asked Questions" list apparently provided by the lab's communications department, says that the lab had used "25 different strains." (Mr. Stubbs left the lab on medical leave with a back problem in March 2000). Was one of those strains the US Army "Ames" strain that was used in the attacks? If so, was it avirulent or virulent (an avirulent strain has a key plasmid removed)? Dead (irradiated) or alive?

Was it obtained from the Northern Arizona University lab that later sent the Ames strain to the University of California-run facility at Los Alamos in October 2001? (The shipment included a small number of live spores).

The Lawrence Livermore lab worked on the genetic sequencing of the Ames strain with that same Northern Arizona University lab. The Northern Arizona University lab is helping the FBI in the genetic signature of the strain. The Northern Arizona and other researchers could not pinpoint the strain to a particular lab, finding it identical to the strain existing at a number of labs.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency launched anthrax research at the Livermore lab in 1998 precisely because of the Bin Laden anthrax threat. Any theft would be highly ironic.

The question of access and distribution of the Ames strain is the sort of question that arises in any objective consideration of the means, motive, modus operandi and opportunity of the anthrax crimes. The CIA reportedly is quietly building a case that the anthrax mailings were an international plot led by Ayman Zawahiri. If Lawrence Livermore wants to be allowed to operate the BL-3 lab it is constructing (and receive deadly pathogens by mail). it should demonstrate its public accountability by promptly addressing whether it had the virulent Ames strain as of March 2000.
____

http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/iraq/article.jsp?id=23665400&sub=Weapons%20inspections
By Debora MacKenzie

Kimothy Smith is a molecular epidemiologist whose research on genetic variation in anthrax unexpectedly bought him extra work after last year 's US anthrax attacks. He was a co-author of a key paper ( Science, vol 296, p 2028) which compared the detailed DNA sequence of the anthrax used in the attacks to several unidentified, virulent "Ames" strains. He helped uncover the only site at which these strains differed a discovery that may yet help nail the perpetrator

It seems more and more likely that the UN weapons inspectors will get the chance to find out whether Iraq is hiding biological weapons. Are you packed and ready to go?

I was placed on the roster of potential bioweapons inspectors last year, so yes, I have a bag packed. The majority of inspectors I know who work for UNMOVIC (the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) are what I guess you 'd call ordinary scientists, with additional training and experience.

Like many of the rest of the inspectors, this will be your first time doing anything like this. What can a bunch of biologists do to uncover Saddam 's bioweapons if he doesn 't want you to find them?

Perhaps nothing, perhaps everything. It works like this Iraq declares its manufacturing or imports that have a legitimate use, but could also be used for illicit weapons. Then the inspectors put that declaration together with everything else they know, and visit facilities, to see if things add up. If things don 't, they follow up the discrepancies. This thorough, systematic and careful investigation something that good scientists do very well is likely to get the job done.

Is someone going to use serious bioweapons in the next decade?

I sincerely hope not, but I fear that they will. I 'm not willing to bet that they won 't. But I think we are as ready as the current state of technology and knowledge allows, and getting better prepared every day.

You didn 't always make your living studying deadly bioweapons, did you?

No, I started as a veterinarian in Oklahoma, where I grew up. I also farmed 1000 acres of wheat and cotton, and had a couple of hundred head of cattle. But after a while, I felt like my brain was drying up. While veterinary practice and farming have their challenges, there just aren 't too many intellectual challenges in a dust-bowl Oklahoma town. But there 's family. Too much of it. I am related to nearly everyone in that three-county area.

So you fled to a PhD course at Louisiana State in Baton Rouge but not to study anthrax?

Nope, red cockaded woodpeckers. They 're very endangered, with only a few thousand left, and the biologists trying to reintroduce them into new areas weren 't having much luck. I tried to discover why, and also what pathogens might be lurking to ruin the translocation. But the folks doing the work didn 't really want to know about pathogens, and the politics of trying to work with an endangered species were impossible I mean, it took me a whole year to get my hands on an actual bird. Moving into anthrax research allowed me to continue working on the epidemiology of infectious disease but with more funds.

And travel

Yeah. One day Martin Hugh-Jones, one of the professors, announced he was looking for a graduate student to collect anthrax in Kruger National Park in South Africa. And I said, where do I sign?

Why Kruger?

Kruger Park is ideal for studying anthrax in its natural state, where it is part of the ecology. It 's entirely likely that anthrax evolved in that region of southern Africa, based on the genetic analyses we 've performed, because it 's where the most genetic diversity is, including some variants found nowhere else we know of. And there probably isn 't another place on Earth where such good records of outbreaks have been kept for so long and over so large an area, with natural hosts for anthrax, and regular epidemics. The best thing about it was being exposed to a different culture, set in such beautiful landscapes, and getting to see wildlife in the natural setting. On the other hand, one day I was walking some way in front of Valarius De Vos, the top South African anthrax expert, looking for the places you find anthrax spores hyena dung is good. Suddenly he called out "Kimothy, be very still." I looked up and there were three bull elephants not ten metres from me. They checked me out, then slowly moved away. But it was scary.

What is so interesting about anthrax?

One of the coolest things about anthrax unfortunately, it 's a bit Hannibal Lecter-ish is that it 's one of the very few organisms that needs to kill its host to reproduce. The victim has to die and bleed for the bacteria to escape back into the soil. In fact, if you cover an elephant that died of anthrax with thorn bushes to keep the vultures off, it doesn 't bleed and the anthrax doesn 't form as many spores in the soil. It 's a risky lifestyle for a pathogen, feast or famine. But anthrax has solved the problem by lying dormant for decades, waiting for a new victim. Human beings have a long history with anthrax yet we still don 't have a good handle on everything there is to know about it. The events of the past year underscored that.

When the first victim of the anthrax mailings died in Florida, the lab where you were working got samples of the bacteria almost immediately.

We had a very powerful technique for reliably distinguishing between different genetic variants of anthrax. We were using it to study anthrax biodiversity round the world, and how anthrax evolved. But a few of us also realised how it might also be used forensically, to trace the source of a pathogen. We use variable number tandem repeats (VNTRs) which are small, repetitive DNA sequences. Some mutate slowly and some mutate very quickly, faster than the random single nucleotide changes, or SNPs, often used to track genetic variation. The more they differ between samples, the longer the bacteria have been apart. The rapidly changing VNTRs are ideal for differentiating very closely related isolates, for example in forensic investigations, because they can differ in bacteria that have been separated for relatively few generations.

What did you find?

We found a very fast-mutating string of adenines that could distinguish between several possible sources of the anthrax used in the attacks. I can 't say more than that, because I 'm under a non-disclosure agreement with the FBI.

What else can you use these VNTRs for?

The more slowly changing VNTRs can trace phylogenetic relationships within the species, sometimes within the whole genus, across a region or even worldwide. VNTRs have long been used to type eukaryotic species, such as humans as we saw in the O.J. Simpson trial. They were also used to distinguish HIV samples from different patients in the mid-1990s but, other than that, using them on microorganisms is fairly new, possibly because microbial and eukaryotic geneticists rarely cross paths. Maybe that will change now. But VNTRs can help unravel unanswered questions in the epidemiology and ecology of pathogens. For example, folks have speculated that cattle trails, like the Old Chisholm Trail, helped disperse anthrax across the US. And we are using VNTRs to try to find genetic evidence for that.

When you started studying anthrax, did you realise there was so much interest in it as a biological weapon?

Yes and no. I was aware of its history during the Second World War, and that the Soviets and the US had both done research on it. I became aware of the evidence that Iraq had investigated its use later, during my time as a graduate student in Louisiana. But the depth and breadth of its potential as a biological weapon in warfare and terrorism no. But it wasn 't long before I learned that some of the people you meet at anthrax conferences aren 't really scientists. Once I was having a drink with two South African ladies at a scientific conference on anthrax there, when this guy literally popped up out of the bushes, tipped over the wine bottle, and put an end to our conversation. I don 't want to say much more about it, but it wasn 't an accident.

What was it like working on the anthrax case in the glare of publicity?

Distracting. Very distracting. Within a week we had TV crews parked outside the building. At one point we were about to have a lab meeting. The office door was open a crack, and the lens of a television camera actually came poking through the door. The head of the lab slammed the door, and we got the building security to escort them out.

If you had to do it over, what would you do differently? And what would you tell a scientist in a similar spot?

I 'd get more sleep and make my team get more sleep too. And I 'd advise anyone facing this to make friends with your institution 's public information person. They can help protect you.

How has anthrax and pathogen research changed since 11 September and the anthrax attacks?

The cost of doing business with the "select agent" pathogens that are potential bioweapons has increased. There is more paperwork and tighter security. The regulations are changing, too, such as who can work with them. I understand the necessity for this, but it takes time away from the science and increases the financial burden. And the funding agencies are having a lot of trouble distributing all this new money. There are a lot of proposals to sift through, and they just can 't do it fast enough. The upside is that there is much more funding for research on infectious diseases, and for the public health system. The pay-off for society is a better knowledge base and early warning system for infectious diseases, including those that could be agents of terror.

Is your new lab, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, already benefiting from the increased funding?

Yes, we 're planning lots of new work. One particularly exciting area is the sequencing of human and agricultural viral pathogens for which there is little or no sequence information available. I 'd rather not say which ones right now.

There 's some controversy about scientists publishing the genetic sequences of dangerous viruses, especially since one lab managed to reconstruct an infectious polio virus from scratch just by knowing its genetic sequence.

Until we 're told differently, we plan to publish our results in full. Making our results available to other researchers means scientists can make advances to safeguard against bioterrorism. We simply have to practise responsible science. What a thing to say! But good scientists are also human beings, they can make good value judgments. Scientists are not amoral just because they follow the scientific method. They can decide what science is right to do, and what science may not be.

What research do we need to do to guard against future attacks?

Everything from pathogen ecology, life history, virulence, pathogenesis and host-pathogen interactions, to new therapies and prophylaxis and detection technologies. One thing we especially need is global maps of the background genetic variation in pathogens. It feeds basic science as well as forensic investigation. For that, we need good fieldwork and international collaboration. And we could learn a lot from people 's existing collections if they haven 't already destroyed them. Some people are doing that because they don 't want the hassle of having these agents around with all the recent attention they 've been getting.

As you wait to find out about Iraq, military personnel are about to get the controversial anthrax vaccine. Have you had it?

Yes. I 've been vaccinated for a number of years now. If you 're really facing exposure to anthrax, then the risk of any side effects has to be preferable to the disease. The only real side effect that I 've suffered so far was an urge to grow my hair long and pierce my ear.


From New Scientist Magazine   26 October 02