Iraq war: Origins of conflict

1911: Turkish, German and British interests form the
Turkish Petroleum Corporation to explore Iraq, then known
as Mesopotamia

1920s: United Kingdom gains control over oil development
in Mesopotamia. The national boundaries of the new Iraq
are drawn. Herbert Hoover and other officials demand entry
of U.S. oil interests, led by the predecessors of today’s
ExxonMobil, which gain minority shares in the TPC, which
is renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company. Other shareholders
are Anglo-Persian (today’s BP-Amoco), Royal Dutch-Shell,
and the new French government-controlled Companie
Francaise des Petroles (CFP, today’s TotalFinaElf).

1934: IPC begins producing oil from the huge Kirkuk field.

1940s: British forces use air strikes and a land invasion to
counter the elected nationalist Iraqi, Rashid Ali, who tilted
the country toward Germany. After the conclusion of World
War II, a State Department assessment finds that Middle
East oil “constituted a stupendous source of strategic power,
and one of the greatest material prizes in world history—
probably the richest economic prize in the world in the field
of foreign investment.”

1961: General Abdel Karim Qassim nationalizes all of
IPC’s prospecting tracts and leaves the foreign consortium
with only its three producing fields.

February 1963: A CIA-assisted coup sweeps Qassim
from office, and he is summarily shot.

July 1968: The Ba’athist regime—that which empowered
Saddam Hussein – takes control in a bloodless coup.

June 1, 1972: The Ba’athist government grabs the
remainder of IPC’s assets in Iraq, except for IPC’s interests
in Basrah Petroleum which the government took over in
1975. At the time of the nationalization, the ownership
structure was essentially the same as it was in the 1920s:
Exxon, Mobil, BP, and Total.

May 1981: State Department official Thomas Eagleton
meets with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, and signals
a thaw in U.S.-Iraqi oil business relations.
August 13, 1981: Iranian news agenc
y reports that
Iraq used chemical weapons in a mountain pass battle.

March 1982: Syria, pledging solidarity with Iran, closes
a major oil export pipeline from Iraq.

1983 to 1988: Iraqi planes drop at least 13,000 chemical
bombs.

October-November 1983: Iranian government cites
several Iraqi air and ground chemical attacks.

December 2, 1983: State Department invites Bechtel
officials to discuss a new oil pipeline to run from Iraq to the
Gulf of Aqaba, Jordan.

December 20, 1983: President Reagan’s special
Middle East envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, meets with Aziz and
Hussein in Baghdad. Much talk revolves around the Bechtel
pipeline proposal. No mention is made of any discussion of
weapons of mass destruction, despite Iraq having allegedly
used them in recent weeks.

January 14, 1984: Secretary of State George Shultz
considers “virtually all sales of non-munitions list dual use
equipment to Iraq,” and adds, “there are recent reports that
Iraq is giving priority to pursuing an Aqaba pipeline as an
additional oil export outlet.”

February 29, 1984: Bechtel executive notes that “the
State Department has exerted strong pressure on Ex-Im to
make additional credits available [in Iraq], including for this
pipeline.”

March 5, 1984: U.S. State Department issues a public
statement condemning Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in
the war against Iran.

March 9, 1984: State Department official urges Ex-Im to
start short-term loans for Iraq “for foreign relations purposes.”

March 24, 1984: In message to Rumsfeld, Secretary
Shultz worries that the Iraq-U.S. relationship was becoming
more distant because of the March 5 condemnation. He also
worries about “Iraqi perceptions that Ex-Im financing for
the Aqaba pipeline is out of the question.”

March 26, 1984: Rumsfeld again meets with Aziz in
Baghdad to discuss regional politics and the pipeline. The
same day, a United Nations investigation confirms that Iraqi
forces had used chemical munitions against Iran.

April 6, 1984: U.S. diplomat James Placke meets with
Iraqi diplomat Kizam Hamdoon in Amman, Jordan, and
asks Iraq not to “embarrass” the United States by purchasing
chemical weapons from U.S. suppliers.

May 25, 1984: After Iraqi and Jordanian officials
authorize preparatory documents, Bechtel official H.B. Scott
tells his colleagues that “U.S. government officials at the
highest level in Washington know of the project and the
President supports the concept… I cannot emphasize enough
the need for maximum Bechtel management effort at all levels
of the US Government and industry to support this project.
It has significant geopolitical overtones…. The time may
be right for this project to move promptly with very significant
rewards to Bechtel for having made it possible.”

June 21, 1984: Ex-Im’s board of directors approves a
preliminary commitment of $484.5 million in loan guarantees
for the Aqaba pipeline project. Ex-Im maintained this
commitment until 1986.

July 24, 1984: Bechtel applies for $85 million in political
risk insurance from OPIC.

January 1985: Swiss billionaire Bruce Rappaport,
friend of Israeli Prime Minister Simon Peres, negotiates
deal with Bechtel that would give him an exclusive oil-lift
agreement and a 10 percent discount on the oil purchase
price. Rappaport calls this “a quid pro quo for a written
security guarantee” from Israel.

February 23, 1985: Edwin Meese III becomes U.S.
Attorney General.

February 25, 1985: Peres gives his assurance that
Israel will guarantee against “unprovoked aggression”
toward the pipeline project. This promise apparently is not
strong enough for Iraq. Rappaport turns his attention toward
obtaining U.S. government insurance to back Peres’ pledge.

May 1985: Rappaport hires Robert E. (Bob) Wallach to
represent him in the pipeline project. Within hours, Wallach
contacts Attorney General Meese. Wallach wants the U.S.
government to extend political risk insurance for the Aqaba
pipeline. Meese owes Wallach money for past legal assistance.

June 1985: At Meese’s suggestion, National Security
Council gets to work trying to figure out a financing
arrangement that would not require congressional approval.

July 1985: Pipeline promoters hire James Schlesinger
(the former Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Defense, and
Director of the CIA) and William B. Clark, Reagan’s former
National Security Advisor.

August 1, 1985: Clark meets with Iraqi officials in
Baghdad. He makes little progress.

September 25, 1985: Wallach hand-delivers a letter
from Prime Minister Peres to Meese, who writes,
“Discretion is demanded on our part.” Wallach tells Meese
that under an arrangement “which would be denied everywhere…
a portion of these [pipeline] funds will go directly
to labor.” That is, pipeline income would be funneled into
Peres’ Labor Party.

December 1985: Robert McFarlane resigns as
National Security Advisor, threatening financing arrangements
sought by pipeline promoters.

December 31, 1985: Iraqi and Jordanian officials tell
Bechtel the pipeline plan “does not satisfy our objectives”
and rejects it.

January 29, 1986: Wallach, according to a Bechtel
memo, tells the company that “it is now time to confidentially
reveal to Iraqis that the funding behind the $400 million
is Defense and other funds.” A Bechtel executive
remarked, “This was to have been done by Judge Clark
when he went to Baghdad.”

July 1, 1987: Bechtel asks OPIC to continue its registration
for the project. “Although there is a low probability of
going forward, please retain this registration,” they request.

May 16, 1988: Under examination for, among other
things, his role in the pipeline financial arrangements,
Meese resigns as Attorney General.

March 20, 2003: U.S. forces invade Iraq with immediate
goal of “regime change.”

arch/ive/ief (2000 - 2005)