The Arab States and the Intifada: A relay race

Nassar Ibrahim- Alternative Information Center
Dr Majed Nassar – Deputy Director of Health Work Committees

"The Arab world seems to be an exception to the democratic changes elsewhere in the world. It is a region where oppression and absolutism reigns. Human rights are violated broadly and on different levels. The rule of law is absent and the riches are unfairly distributed in a much more visible way than any place on earth.

The rich people behave superficially, stupidly and pretentiously. Corruption is widespread and the rights of the marginalised sectors of society, in particular the poor, women and minorities, are neglected. There is an enormous amount of violence which takes several forms, like long-lasting cruel civil wars and terror movements that waste the lives of citizens as well as foreign visitors".

Prof. Muhammad Sayyed Said
Consultant to the Arab committee for human rights

The people still remember the day when the old general Sharon came to power after defeating the young general Barak in the last Israeli elections. Sharon's victory was a lightning bolt that struck the Palestinian leadership and Arab regimes. The initial reaction was one of surprise, despair and depression. Most people predicted the area descending into still greater violence. Loud cries of protest came from all quarters of the Arab world from those seeking to isolate Sharon and protect the peace process.

A different opinion came forth from the United States administration which viewed Israeli 'democracy' as a model for the 'wild Middle East', notwithstanding the Jewish state's inhumane policies and more than 35 years of illegal military occupation. The US immediately protected Sharon and turned all its efforts to strengthening its relationship with the old general. It seemed that the United States was ready to sacrifice the peace process in an attempt to legitimise its pro-Israeli bias, even as Sharon was leading the region deeper into confrontation.

It was said then that the most extreme and cruel leaders are the ones able to make historic decisions. It was noted that Menachem Begin from the Likud was the one who reached a peace agreement with Egypt. Sharon, it was argued, was now head of the government and not the same adolescent Sharon who led the opposition. "Give him a chance", Washington implored. The Arab regimes and the Palestinian Authority accepted the U.S. vision, firstly because they had no realistic choice and secondly because they lacked their own independent vision.

Instead of having his right-wing government risk isolation, Sharon began surrounding the Arab capitals and dictating terms. Within a few months his tanks were aiming their guns into the bedroom of Arafat, confining him to his destroyed compound and isolating him completely from the outside world.

Sharon declared a comprehensive war against the Palestinian people and their political, economic and cultural structures without having any one dare to oppose him or condemn his acts. This situation was made possible after Bush announced that "Israel has the right to defend itself." Sharon became the "man of peace" while the resistance movement of the Palestinian people was declared an illegal terrorist organisation. Arafat, not Sharon, became the outcast.

Though the first reaction of the Arab regimes was to call for solidarity with Palestinian resistance, power changes in the Middle East presented the Arab regimes with a serious test which led to the unfortunate (but unsurprising) revelation that the regimes were more impotent and paralysed than ever before, both internally and externally. As a consequence, the first position of the Arab states gave way to another that abruptly adopted the U.S. vision of taking the Israeli side with little to no discrimination.

The question is, did the Arab regimes have any viable alternative but to retreat and collapse before the United States-Israeli alliance?

If we are to move away from simplistic, if persuasive, conspiracy theories which attribute the poor performance of Arab regimes to "external" factors, we must analyse their economic, political and class structures as wielding tremendous influence on their external and internal policies. In these terms, we would wish to argue that a political system that does not adopt an internal policy to respect the individual and national interests of its people, and does not work to enhance democratic understandings and build a solid and sound social security system, is unlikely to adopt an external policy that protects the national interests from external threats.

Over the years the Palestinian cause has always been important for the region as a whole, and therefore has provided much cause for concern for the Arab regimes. On the one hand, the Palestinian cause holds such general public approval that any political approach that fails to take Palestinian national rights into consideration would find itself in a permanent clash with the Arab masses. On the other hand, the Palestinian cause has always been a reason for mobilising the Arab masses against the regimes themselves.

Principles of Resistance

Within this framework, the Palestinian resistance movement (the Intifada) has become an expression of the Palestinian and Arab conscience and status of awareness; it has become the model to which all other movements are compared in terms of influence upon the collective mind of the Arab masses.

The Palestinian resistance movement reached legendary horizons and became, along with the Lebanese model, a comparative issue. It contained the potential to transform the national liberation struggle to a social and political liberation struggle against those Arab regimes which are confiscating the economic and political rights of the Arab people. The Palestinian people proved through their steadfastness, sacrifice and resistance that, despite being clearly overwhelmed by foreign arms and external finance, and despite suffering from an imbalance of power, they have persevered in their resistance movement and clung firmly to their rights. This stands in clear contrast to the official speeches of the Arab regimes that have referred to the uselessness of the resistance movement toward the U.S./Israeli alliance.

Most Arab regimes acknowledged very early on the dangers of the spreading of the revolutionary ethos of the Intifada, an ethos which threatens not to stop at the borders of the occupation army. Its lessons and its political and humane values transcend boundaries and threaten release of the huge kinetic potential of human resources, economic power, natural reserves and the liberation of the culture and values of the Arab world.

Due to the weak performance of the Arab regimes and their political and economic fellowship with the imperialist countries, they have been transformed into subdued regimes which, in turn, have subdued Arab society over the last decades, making them backward and lacking in a political, social and economic vision to create a future of hope. At the same time, resistance activities against these dynamics are establishing themselves in every country in the Arab world as a natural process to improve individual and societal conditions.

Despite the outstanding kinetic potential of the Arab world, most of the Arab people suffer from poverty, unemployment, oppression, the absence of democracy, poor social security systems and the inadequate developmental visions of their leaders. Furthermore, these societies suffer from political disunity. The national interests and the Pan-Arab national decisions are controlled by the multinational companies and foreign capital which promote a consumer culture that stands in opposition to thoughts of Pan-Arab progressiveness.

Mapping the Middle East

In view of this general panorama, how should we interpret the positions and behaviour of the Arab regimes, and in which direction are the vectors of their movement aimed? It is imperative to note that while we use the term Arab regimes, we still have to distinguish between each individual regime and avoid dealing with them as if the one were simply copies of one another.

The Nationalist Arab regimes, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon are still applying a policy of resistance regardless of external pressures. They have, to varying degrees, internal and external social, political and economic visions that do not necessarily conform with the vision of the United States.

The so-called moderate regimes, including Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are considered allies of the United States and with the exception of Saudi Arabia, have signed peace treaties with Israel. As the political balance of power stands at the moment, the rest of the Arab countries are of a very limited influence in forming Pan-Arab policies either because they are geographically distant or embroiled in their internal problems-as is the case in Algeria, Tunis, Libya, Sudan and Yemen.

As such, there are two streams that are drawing the policy in the Arab World: the axis of Syria and Lebanon which finds support in Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Algeria, and the axis of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia which finds support in Morocco, Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf states. There are, of course, many contradictions, inconsistencies, disagreements and competition between the members of the first axis. The Syrian-Iraqi dispute, for example, is still unresolved despite the detente and rapprochement between the two states. Lebanon is still attempting to minimise the influence and presence of Syria.

There is also clear competition between Saudi Arabia, which considers itself the cradle of Islam and has a strong relationship with the United States, and Egypt, which is a fulcrum of Arab thought, human resources, human power, history and culture. Jordan has an ‘in-between' status but retains significance despite the disengagement of its political and administrative bond with the West Bank (as announced by the late King Hussein in July 1988) by virtue of the fact that more than half of the people in Jordan are of Palestinian origin and Jordan has the longest border with Israel.

Although Egypt and Jordan have peace treaties with Israel, both have similar problems in selling the peace treaties to their public. In both countries, grassroots opposition to the treaties is strong. The significance of the so-called "moderate" axis is evidenced no less significantly than by the inclusion in this axis of the Palestinian Authority, which also follows what is perceived as a ‘pragmatic' policy line in relation to the U.S. and Israel.

Lowest Common Denominators

The relations between Arab countries are regulated according to the grade of inconsistencies or the amount of interests that happen to overlap at a given time. However, all differences aside, the following major features are common to all:

The relations of those regimes with their constituencies is based on oppression. The regimes see in the political movement of the people a threat to their own legitimacy and privileges;

Those regimes came to power through military coups or through inheritance or unbelievably contrived elections (e.g., winning by 99.9%);
Most of the regimes deal with the Palestinian problem in a manner that serves their own interests, and often little else. In short, they use the Palestinian problem to legitimise their own power;
Most of the regimes are hostile to democratic changes whether of political, social or cultural nature. These regimes view democracy as a threat to their stability and they deal with democracy only as a method of cementing their own power, not to unleash their people's capabilities and energies;

The position and daily practices of the Arab regimes toward the Palestinian resistance movement (the Intifada) constantly reveal decreasing levels of enthusiasm and support. The reason and motivations for this frustrating reality can be traced to the following significant stages of the Intifada:

The first stage From the beginning of the Intifada on 28 September 2000 through to the fall of Barak in February 2001.

Most of the Arab regimes viewed the Intifada as a spontaneous response by the Palestinians to the provocative visit of Sharon to the Al Haram Al Sharif. They dealt with the Intifada initially as a limited or transient phenomenon, which would soon wear itself out. They saw the Intifada as an attempt to improve the conditions of the Oslo agreement within its own context, but never as an effort to create an alternative to Oslo.

The Arab regimes also saw the Intifada as a convenient tool for improving their own image at home. This was evident in many political addresses hailing the Intifada as the realisation of a legitimate right of the Palestinian people to resist the occupation. In addition, they used the Intifada to agitate against many oppressive policies of Israel.

Barak's massive violent reaction to the outbreak of the Intifada very quickly bred hope in those regimes for a swift end to the Intifada. However the ability of the Palestinian people and their political movement to absorb Israeli blows, their readiness to make still greater sacrifices and the clarity of their political goals for freedom and independence started to worry the Arab regimes, especially after the Arab mass movement began forming a larger support mechanism for the Palestinian people.

The Arab regimes, especially those moderate regimes, clearly showed their dismay and started to press the Palestinian leadership to halt the Intifada and accept whatever the United States administration and Israel called for in terms of political and security settlements during the Camp David summit and later in Taba.

Arafat refused "Barak's generous offer" and he immediately felt pressure not only from the United States, but also from several Arab leaders. Arafat remained steadfast and insisted on the national rights of the Palestinian people to demand a withdrawal of Israeli soldiers to the June 4th borders, the right to return, dismantling of the settlements and Jerusalem. President Clinton threatened Arafat very clearly, "If you do not sign, Israel will wage war against you with the backup of the United States."

The concerns of the Arab regimes started to grow as it became evident the situation was threatening to spiral out of control. The resistance movement was growing stronger. On the other hand Barak, who was preparing a comprehensive war, was acting under two influences: first, his conviction that he could stop the Palestinian resistance movement through the use of greater force; and second, increasing pressure from the Likud opposition and Sharon.

In March 2001 the Arab Summit held in Amman reached agreement on the following points:

Glorifying the Intifada and its heroism,
Condemnation of Israeli policies and practices,
Approval of a plan to support the Palestinian people,
Formation of a committee to follow up on the incidents in Palestine.

The resolutions of the Arab summit were approved despite the contradictions between the two axis in the Arab world: the nationalist axis (Syria, Iraq, Lebanon) called for the boycott of Israel, the condemnation of U.S. bias in favour of Israel and the unconditional support for the Intifada. The moderate axis (Jordan, Egypt) emphasized its support for the Intifada and condemnation of the Israeli occupation, but insisted on asking the United States to play a bigger role to stop the violence in the region. They refused the idea of boycotting Israel and considered their ongoing relations with Israel as holding the possibility to influence Israel positively.

At this conference, Saudi Arabia distinguished itself through its criticism of the United States and reassurance of financial support for the Palestinian people. Indeed, this was an attempt by the Saudis to secure a leading role based on their economic power, influence in the Gulf Cooperation Council and its long-standing relationship with the United States.
It is noteworthy that the Arab Summit usually meets to discuss Pan-Arab issues. Nevertheless, top-level meetings of Arab leaders, whether at the level of their foreign ministries or in affiliation with the Arab league, remain captive to the rivalries among the different countries. For this reason their decisions are usually vague and non-binding, and the Arab masses tend not to take the Arab summits seriously, with the possible exception of the first one in 1964 under the leadership of Jamal Abdel Nasser.

Shortly before the Arab summit, Barak lost the Israeli elections on 6 February 2001 and Sharon came to power.

The second stage: From Sharon's accession in March 2001 through 11 September 2001.

Barak had failed to crush the Intifada, as he had failed in the Israeli elections. Sharon came to power as the King of Israel, the saviour. He was not elected because he had an overall vision for peace or a unique master plan for solving the Middle East conflict. He was elected because he promised the Israeli public absolute security. He was the general with a bloody history. He was the "hero" of 1973 war with Egypt and the commander who taught the Palestinian people in Gaza a lesson from 1970 to 1973.His chances of winning the elections were not at all diminished by his past masterminding of the invasion of Lebanon and Beirut and the 1982 massacres in Sabra and Shatilla.

Sharon's election was a challenge for the Intifada as much as it was an embarrassment for Israel's friends. It further presented the Arab regimes with another serious test of their credibility among the Arab people. The unpleasant picture of Sharon in the Arab world helped the Arab regimes to elevate the tone of their political rhetoric to include the cry for isolating Sharon if that were to prove necessary.

Initially the speeches of Arab leaders were aggressive. Nevertheless, they expected that the elected general would crush the Intifada within one hundred days as he had promised. They calculated in both directions; if Sharon were to succeed in suppressing the Intifada, then it is good for them. And if the Intifada were to succeed in bringing down Sharon, then it is also good for them.

But the expectations of the Arab regimes were undermined by the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and the efficiency of their resistance movement, the increasing losses on the Israeli side (in both human and economic terms) and the increasingly oppressive measures of the Israeli army.

The dilemma for the Arab regimes grew complicated when the Palestinian resistance movement succeeded in establishing a certain delicate balance with the occupying forces. As the confusion of the regimes held no foreseeable resolution, they increased their call for the United States to play a bigger role. (The game had become too dangerous for their liking.) They continued to support the Intifada but only in their speeches. The first sign of diversion took the form of directing their financial support not to the Palestinian National Authority, but to international and national non-governmental organisations. Their support suddenly acquired a more humanitarian character, intended to avoid political support of the Palestinian authority.

During this period it became evident that Sharon was unable to crush the Intifada. The Israeli public started to question where he was taking them. He responded with an agenda that emphasised power over negotiations or compromise. His speeches became more radical than before and the government's assassination policy proceeded to reach its highest peak to date.

Sharon's open and comprehensive war against the Palestinians was met with increasingly softer speeches by the Arab leaders. It culminated when the Qatari Foreign Minister, Hamad ben Jasem, stated that the Arabs should go to the United States "begging" for an end to Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people.

The third stage: From 11 September 2001 through the Arab summit in Beirut in March 2002.

The United States declared a comprehensive war on international terrorism. It started to reorganise its schedule and priorities. Disguising its actions in the events of September 11th, the United States began to settle outstanding accounts with those states it resented for failing to conform with its policies.

Sharon rode the U.S. wave to settle the Israeli account with the Palestinian people. Until that time Sharon was under heavy attack, not only from the international community but also from the Israeli community for not being able to end the Intifada as he had promised. He neglected the economy and the deterioration of all sectors in the Israeli society, especially the tourism sector. Sharon found no way to subdue the Intifada with the measures he used at that time. The incident of September 11th provided him with an opportunity to maximise the use of force. He pushed militarily, politically and economically to crush the resistance movement. With U.S. support he declared that his war against the Palestinian people was part of the campaign against international terrorism. Arafat became tantamount to Bin Laden and the Palestinian resistance movement was compared to the Taliban.

In view of Washington's new formula ("Those who are not with us are against us") and its embrace of Israeli oppression ("Israel is defending itself"), greater inconsistencies emerged between the Arab regimes and the Palestinian leadership, as well as the Resistance. The official Arab position lost space to manoeuvre and accordingly started to readjust itself, especially after the U.S.-Israeli alliance left no room for objection or criticism. Washington started to demand very clear statements of policy consistent with its own vision.

In the meantime, the United States' relatively easy victory in Afghanistan increased its appetite for influence in to the Middle East. Driven by the common interests of the United States and Israel and the oppressive measures of the "Israeli General" under the slogan of fighting international terrorism, the United States pushed to enforce its will, and that of Israel, in the Middle East. However, this endeavour faced two major obstacles: firstly, the Palestinian resistance movement was unbreakable and escalating and secondly, Iraq was steadfast in rejecting U.S. demands.

Just as the Palestinian cause represents a moral and historic cause for the Arab masses, it also represents a model for improving one's own situation. This fact pushed the United States to seek an end to the Palestinian "problem" as soon as possible, driving the Bush administration out of its initial silence. It was difficult, if not impossible, for Washington to finish its business with Iraq without first dealing with the Palestinian problem.

In view of this, U.S. policies took four major strategies:

Unleashing Sharon and his machinery against the Palestinian people under the slogan "Israel has the right to defend itself;"
Isolating Arafat by referring to a loss of trust in him and describing him as impotent and useless in controlling the "Palestinian terror;"
Asking the axis of "moderate" countries - Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia - to declare openly their willingness to work to stop the Intifada and reject the "Palestinian terror;"
Pressuring the axis of national countries - Syria and Lebanon - while threatening them with war and categorising them with the "axis of evil" countries, in addition to speaking openly of the need to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

Pressure from the Arab masses grew as greatly as the countervailing pressure from Washington, leaving the Arab regimes between the hammer and anvil, a situation accommodated by the resolutions of the Beirut summit in March 2002. There, the axis of the "moderate" regimes and those of the national axis accepted the Saudi initiative that had been published beforehand in several international newspapers.

This particular incident angered several Arab leader and would certainly have contributed to Mubarak's and King Abdallah's boycott of the summit, claiming their absence was an act of solidarity with Arafat who was prevented by Israel from leaving the country.
Saudi Arabia knew well that Amman and Cairo would have to support the initiative, not only because the United States and Europe had approved it but also because the Palestinian leadership did so as well. This explains why Saudi Arabia was more concerned to convince Damascus and Beirut.

On his way to meet Colin Powell, the Saudi Crown prince traveled through Damascus to Morocco without stopping in Cairo or Amman. In general, the acceptance of the Saudi initiative was an attempt of the Arab regimes to prostrate themselves before the United States. They sought to push themselves into the limelight as if they had something to contribute. Arafat, whom Israel prevented from attending the Beirut summit, agreed with the Saudi initiative, which called for the implementation of the land-for-peace formula and normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. The refugee problem was to be postponed for further negotiations.

The forth stage: From the Israeli invasion of Palestinian cities on 28 March 2002 through the speech of President Bush on 24 June 2002

The invasion (reoccupation) by the Israeli army of the Palestinian cities and villages and the massive destruction it left behind came as a military and political response to the resolutions of the Beirut summit, that were widely considered a strategy for peace. The invasion was a slap in the face of all Arab regimes.

As much as Sharon wanted to teach Arafat a lesson and as much as he wanted to end the Palestinian resistance movement, forcing both to surrender, he also wanted to send a message to the Arab leaders. Its essence was that the horizon of the initiative was still too high and, instead, they needed to make unending concessions. Needless to say, the initiative was rejected de facto by Israel while the United States for a moment lost its perpetual justification for Israel and agreed to meet with the Saudi crown prince to discuss the initiative. When the two leaders met the initiative was killed, and the Arab regimes have not uttered a word to defend their own initiative.

Washington's support for Israel and its military options and the cruelty of the invasion caused high losses on the Palestinian side involving the severe destruction of the cities, crops and homes. This revealed the Arab regimes' latest phase of impotence and re-ignited the Palestinian resistance. Developments moved the Arab masses for a while, leading to an explosion in the streets from Morocco to the Arab (Persian) Gulf. This revealed again the deep inconsistency found between the Arab masses and their governments.

The Arab regimes found themselves in a quagmire. The Arab uproar was understood to be a political or social expression of a multi-dimensional discourse in the following three dimensions:

The first dimension expressed the deep frustration and despair within the Arab masses as a result of their difficult economic and political reality;
The second dimension was an expression of solidarity with the Palestinian people, a rejection of U.S. policy, a condemnation of Washington's pro-Israeli bias. The Arab masses reaffirmed that the Palestinian cause is still at the heart of Pan-Arab nationalism;
The third dimension found its expression in the condemnation of the Arab regimes' impotence as much as the declaration of Beirut found a general consensus by the Arab masses.

These three dimensions coalesced in a dialectical manner that led to a forth dimension. The movement of the Arab masses went ahead to express solidarity with the Palestinian people, reject US policy and condemn the impotence of the official Arab regimes, and this process started to transform itself from a movement of rage toward external issues to a movement raising awareness of the internal issues. The continuation of this movement would indeed threaten the interests of the Arab regimes.

This transformation in the movement of the Arab street started to reflect itself at the societal level. It also started to reflect a collective awareness that was maturing through its practice. At its core was the necessity to stand firmly on the side of the Palestinian people and to protect Arab national interests, and these objectives were not possible without radical changes in the Arab society at large, politically, socially and economically.

The movement of the Arab street was no longer a spontaneous expression of solidarity with the Palestinian people, and the Arab regimes never again looked at this movement in such simplistic terms. The movement started to unite all sectors of the society in calling for radical change that would restructure and rebuild the political, economic and social life throughout the Arab world and in each of its member states.

This imminent danger had to be ended as soon as possible before it were to acquire major political power. To this end, the Arab regimes started to pressure Arafat more and more to put an end to the Intifada and take strong measures against the activists. Their positions started to echo those of Washington and Tel Aviv.

Nevertheless, the motives and goals of Washington were not the same of those of the Arab regimes. The Arab regimes desired a political initiative that would stop the uprising of the Arab masses. The United States had a more comprehensive solution in mind: encouraging the Arab leaders to compete with each other over which could please the United States more. Washington wanted to give Sharon enough time to crush the infrastructure of the resistance movement as a first step toward an overall solution based on U.S.-Israeli conditions.

The Bush administration was well aware of the dangers of the movement of the Arab street since it conveys open hostility toward the United States. However, the Bush administration used the same movement as a means of pressuring the Arab regimes and extracting further concessions from them. The price they had to pay Washington was to remain silent as the Palestinian resistance movement was slaughtered and to accept the coming attack on Iraq.

The comprehensive goal of U.S. policy was to bring the Palestinian Authority and the Arab regimes to the point where they could only accept the U.S.-Israeli conditions for the resolution of the Middle East conflict. Washington could then rearrange the region as it saw fit.

The fifth stage: From Bush's speech of 24 June 2002 through the present

The area witnessed a dramatic increase in war activities, invasions and re-invasions as well as increased Palestinian resistance activities. Israel reacted with a comprehensive invasion and siege over many cities and villages, extending a curfew and further damaging the economy. The climate was ready for the United States to present its vision for peace without any serious Arab opposition. The Arab regimes were aware that they had but one choice--to accept the U.S. vision despite the weaknesses and inconsistencies of Bush's speech, which concentrated on the following:

Isolating Arafat and changing the Palestinian leadership;
Restructuring the Palestinian security forces under CIA, Egyptian and Jordanian supervision;
Redrawing of the Palestinian society and its political forces;
Controlling and supervising the economy of the Palestinian Authority.

According to Mr. Bush, the solution of the Middle East conflict was not so urgent. The land-for-peace formula could wait three years or more, and the Arab initiative of the Beirut summit could be buried in the deepest drawer. The lesson was for the Arab monarchs and leaders: if there were to be a solution on the horizon, then it could only be an American one (even if the Saudi initiative did not necessary contradict the most basic U.S. designs for solving the Middle East conflict).

All conditions in Bush's speech were to be met against the gradual alleviation of the pressure and the oppressive measures of the Israeli government. Bush retreated from his demand that the Israeli government should withdraw immediately from Palestinian cities. Never mind that Sharon rejected Bush's demand. As far as the final solution was concerned, this issue could be resolved somehow when the negotiating parties addressed issues including Jerusalem, borders, refugees and settlements.

The Arab regimes, as currently structured and dependent upon the United States, had to accept the U.S. initiative. They also accepted the U.S. terminology regarding terrorism. Even the long- standing ally of the United States, Saudi Arabia, was now receiving indirect threats from Washington regarding its alleged harbouring of terrorists. The present compliance of Saudi Arabia seems to be insufficient. Saudi Arabia is asked to be more careful in its initiatives, not to assert itself too strenuously in dealings with the other Arab regimes. The Arab regimes accepted the restructuring of the Palestinian society on the social, political and economic level that they would never accept in their own countries. But for the United States and Israel this is not the issue.

Finally, why should the Arab regimes not accept the Palestinian Authority being transformed into a copy of themselves?

All done, four main points now characterise the future U.S. policy in the Middle East:

Changing the governments in Palestine, Iraq and Iran;
Continuing the long-term war against "international terrorism;"
Stopping the weapons of mass destruction;
Changing the face of societies in the Middle East (democratisation).

Confronting these objectives, which are for the most part directed against us, we cannot avoid recognising the permanently weak position of Arab leaders, whose political horizons are in chronic decline. What started as their full support of the Palestinian resistance movement ended, after Amman and the Beirut summit, in complete resignation to U.S.-Israeli demands. Any mistake or uproar could cost the head of any Arab leader.

However, life is richer than the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and the results as viewed from a historical viewpoint differ from the results as judged by immediate self-enrichment. What remains certain is that as long as this reality contradicts the interests of the vast majority of the people, the people will strive with their last breath to change it.

arch/ive/ief (2000 - 2005)