arch/ive/ief (2000 - 2005)

Apres le Chef de cabinet de M. Kinnock, qui a pris son envol vers British Airways en 2000, apres avoir aide son patron a s'occuper du secteur des transports dans la Commission Santer, c'est le tour d'un ancien Directeur General de l'Environnement de se placer a la direction de British Nuclear Fuels.

Le Commissaire charge de l'Environnement, l'association Greenpeace et plusieurs parlementaires europeens estiment que cette reconversion n'est pas conforme a la deontologie de la fonction publique europeenne et porte atteinte a l'independance de la Commission.

Mais M. Kinnock ne voit rien d'anormal a ce qu'un high flying official aille poursuivre une fructueuse carriere dans son Etat membre d'origine, y compris en dirigeant une societe qu'il avait la charge de controler quand il etait en poste a la Commission, peu de temps auparavant. A l'appui de sa these, M. Kinnock invoque d'autres cas concernant des ressortissants d'autres Etats membres.

R&D, qui sait que les compatriotes de M. Kinnock ne sont pas seuls en cause, estime necessaire de poser clairement ce probleme vital pour la credibilite de la Commission, dans ses fonctions de regulation de nombreux secteurs essentiels du marche unique.

Il se trouve que notre grand reformateur, qui invoque les faiblesses du statut actuel pour ne pas intervenir dans les cas ci-dessus, n'a pas fait la moindre tentative pour introduire dans ses propositions de reforme des dispositions visant a empecher le renouvellement de ces pratiques, c'est a dire un delai minimum obligatoire (cooling-off period) a imposer a un ex senior official, avant que celui-ci soit autorise d'accepter un emploi en rapport avec ses anciennes fonctions a la Commission.

Au contraire, en offrant ces postes au secteur prive, M. Kinnock ouvre la voie a une multiplication des cas de ce genre. Recrutes a l'exterieur pour des periodes limitees, les futurs Directeurs et Directeurs Generaux seront tentes de preparer la suite de leur carriere en donnant des gages a leur futur employeur.

Que penser d'une Commission qui permet aux membres de son hierarchie aux pouvoirs accrus par la reforme Kinnock, de partir a tout moment avec de confortables indemnites, en ayant eventuellement prepare le terrain a leur futur employeur au cours des derniers mois passes a Bruxelles ?

Qui fera encore confiance a une Commission geree par des managers d'une independance aussi relative? Comment croire qu'une procedure de distorsion de concurrence, de controle de fusion ou de regulation d'un secteur industriel sera reellement menee en toute objectivite et en conformite a l'interet general ?

R&D partage le point de vue de plusieurs membres du Parlement europeen, y compris britanniques, qui estiment que la Commission fait preuve d'une indulgence dangereuse pour elle comme pour le marche unique, ce qui ne renforce ni son independance, ni la credibilite de sa « reforme ».

Mais quel est le veritable objectif de cette reforme ? Renforcer la Commission ou l'affaiblir durablement pour l'empecher d'avoir dans le futur le role qu'elle a joue depuis 1958 ?

Le comite executif

Fruitful Redeployment in the Commission

Further to the departure of the Head of the Cabinet of Mr. Kinnock to British Airways in 2002, and after helping his boss to manage the transport sector during the Santer Commission, it is now the turn of the ex-General Director of Environment to become the Director of British Nuclear Fuels.

The Commissioner responsible for the Environment, "Greenpeace" and several Members of the European Parliament are of the opinion that this redeployment is opposed to the ethics of the European civil service and that the independence of the Commission is undermined.

But Mr. Kinnock doesn't see anything unusual in the fact that a high flying official continues a fruitful career in his homeland Member State even when he manages a company that he was responsible for controlling while he was working in the Commission, shortly before. To support his thesis, Mr. Kinnock puts forwards similar cases with nationals of other Member States.

R&D knows that the fellow countrymen of Mr. Kinnock are not the only ones involved but R&D considers that it is necessary to clearly address this vital problem for the credibility of the Commission in its regulatory duties in numerous essential sectors of the Single Market.

Our great reformer who puts forward the weakness of the current Staff Regulations to justify his non-intervention in both the above mentioned cases, hasn't made the slightest attempt to introduce measures in the reform proposals to avoid the recurrence of these practises. The least which could be expected is a minimum compulsory cooling-off period for ex-senior officials, before they are authorised to accept a job related to their former position in the Commission.

On the contrary, by offering these posts to the private sector, Mr. Kinnock opens the door to other cases. Future Directors and Directors-General recruited externally for limited periods, will be tempted to prepare the continuation of their career by giving guarantees to their future employers.

What can we think about a Commission that allows the members of its hierarchy - (with increased powers thanks to Mr. Kinnock's reform) to leave any time with a comfortable indemnity, possibly having prepared the ground for their future employer during their last months spent in Brussels ?

Who can trust a Commission managed by managers whose independence is only relative? How can we believe that a procedure with concerning distortion of competition, control of mergers or regulation of an industrial sector will be really carried out with full objectivity and in accordance with the general interest ?

R&D shares the opinion of several members of the European Parliament including British nationals, who consider that the Commission is showing a dangerous leniency
towards itself as well as for the Single Market, which neither reinforces its independence nor the credibility of its "reform".

But what is the real objective of this reform? To strengthen the Commission or to weaken it for the long term in order to stop it from playing the role in the future that it has played since 1958?

The Executive Committee