arch/ive/ief (2000 - 2005)

War Criminals: Real and Imagined
by Gregory Elich Friday July 13, 2001 at 06:23 AM
gelich@worldnet.att.net

Arrest of Slobodan Milosevic raises questions


WAR CRIMINALS: REAL AND IMAGINED

By Gregory Elich

The blare of media fanfare exhorts us to celebrate the abduction and
imprisonment of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Though widely
touted as a victory in the American crusade for human rights, the arrest of
Milosevic fits a quite different pattern when seen in the context of the
history of post World War II history. Whether waving the banner of freedom
or waving the banner of human rights, Western leaders have consistently
sought to obscure both their motivations and the often-dreadful consequences
of their actions. Freedom was never a concern. Nor were human rights, but
such rhetorical justifications helped to engage domestic public support for
international adventures designed to serve corporate interests. The lure of
profit always takes precedence over the lives of millions. Every year, 40
million people die needlessly of hunger, victims of a global capitalist
system that cherishes wealth, but human lives not at all. In terms of
death, this silent holocaust is the equivalent of a Second World War - in
which 55 million died - taking place every year and a half. Yet a drop in
the Stock Market evokes more concern. Such a system is monstrous. One can
gauge Western commitment to human rights and justice by examining the record
of these self-appointed judges. History is replete with examples, so a few
cases will have to serve as a synecdoche.
Mass murder in Indonesia elicited a response from Western leaders. They
supported it. A bloody CIA-backed military coup toppled President Sukarno
and brought General Suharto to power in 1965. Following the coup, an
estimated 500,000 to one million members of the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI), trade unionists, peasants and ethnic Chinese were killed in one of
the most barbaric mass slaughters in history. The U.S. government supplied
Suharto with a list of several thousand Indonesian communists it wanted to
see eliminated. Researcher Kathy Kadane discovered through interviews with
former U.S. embassy personnel that "as many as 5,000 names were furnished to
the Army, and the Americans later checked off the names of those who had
been killed or captured."
As the Indonesian Army hunted down and butchered its victims, U.S.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk cabled the embassy in Jakarta that the
"campaign against the PKI must continue," and urged embassy officials to
"get across that Indonesia and Army have real friends who are ready to
help." The U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green, responded to Rusk
that "we have made it clear that Embassy and USG [U.S. Government] generally
sympathetic with and admiring of what army doing."
Unable to keep up with the pace of killing demanded by Washington, the
Army organized Muslim extremists and right wing death squads and set them
loose in a frenzied killing spree. Indonesian generals asked the U.S.
Government for more weapons "to arm Muslim and nationalist youths in central
Java for use against the PKI," and Washington responded quickly with covert
shipments of arms. One former State Department official told Kadane, "No
one cared as long as they were communists that were being butchered." An
internal CIA report later noted that it was "extremely proud" of its role in
the coup.
As Ambassador Green remarked in a cable to Washington, "Bluntest remark
was question of how much is it worth to U.S. that PKI be smashed and trend
here reversed, thereby swinging big part of SEA [Southeast Asia] from
communism." Once Suharto formally assumed the post of acting president on
March 11, 1966, economic aid was forthcoming and U.S. and Western European
advisors helped chart economic policy in New Order Indonesia. By 1967,
Indonesia had rejoined the IMF and World Bank, passed an investment law
favorable to foreign corporations, and was rewarded with a large increase in
U.S. aid, rising to $200 million by 1969. In the years to come, New Order
Indonesia would continue to imprison, torture and execute several hundred
thousand people. Only in Suharto's last months in office did Western
support for him wane, due to a people's revolution which threatened to
topple him. A shift in the West's support was imperative in order to ensure
a cosmetic change of leadership to protect their interests.
In 1983, the CIA supplied a long list of members of the communist Tudeh
Party to the Khomeini government in Iran, branding those identified as
"Soviet agents." The expectation was that these people would be arrested
and executed, a hope that was not disappointed. The Iranian government
sprang into action, arresting and executing 200 party members and outlawing
the Tudeh Party. More arrests would follow, including the entire party
leadership, who were tortured and forced to make false televised
confessions. The British government also supplied information on Tudeh to
Iranian authorities. Eventually over 10,000 members and supporters of Tudeh
would be imprisoned and tortured. In 1989 a specially appointed committee
swept through the prisons and sentenced to death thousands. At least 5,000
people from various political parties were executed, including hundreds of
Tudeh Party members. The U.S. concern was that a post-Khomeini Iran might
move to the left. The Western assisted decimation of Tudeh aimed to
forestall that prospect.
In 1975, Cambodia fell to the Khmer Rouge; virtually the entire country
was turned into a forced labor camp as they implemented a primitive agrarian
economy. Over the next four years as many as two million Cambodians
perished from starvation, disease and executions. Several hundred thousand
people were tortured and murdered in often-brutal ways. Here was crime
against humanity on a grand scale. Following a Khmer Rouge invasion of
Vietnam, counter-attacking Vietnamese forces, in conjunction with an
uprising of the Cambodian people, drove the Khmer Rouge from power in
January 1979. A socialist government led by Hun Sen was established as
Cambodia began its long road back to recovery. Khmer Rouge troops, in
alliance with right-wing forces, launched a fierce guerrilla war against the
new Cambodian government which lasted several years. Guerrilla leaders
Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Son Sann joined the Khmer Rouge in forming a
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which at Western insistence,
represented Cambodia at the United Nations in place of the government of
Cambodia. This provided a fig leaf of legitimacy for Western support of a
movement dominated by the Khmer Rouge. American and British advisors and
arms shipments aided Sihanouk's and Sann's forces, which carried out
coordinated military operations with Khmer Rouge troops and were often
commanded by Khmer Rouge officers. Western arms frequently found their way
into Khmer Rouge arsenals as many members of Sihanouk's and Sann's
organizations belonged to the Khmer Rouge. U.S. officials pressured
humanitarian groups to supply food and aid to help sustain the Khmer Rouge.
After the fall of the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam maintained a troop presence
in Cambodia in order to help defend the fledging Hun Sen government and
prevent the return to power of mass murders. American officials were
outraged, and spared no effort to reverse the situation. Western sponsored
peace negotiations in 1989-1990 succeeded in obtaining the withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops. The second goal of Western negotiators was to replace or
weaken socialist forces in Cambodia. Under pressure, Cambodia was obliged
to bring officials from Son Sann's and Norodom Sihanouk's organizations into
the government. Cambodia was also compelled to restore the monarchy and
place Sihanouk back on the throne. During the peace negotiations, American
officials insisted that the Khmer Rouge be given a prominent role in the new
governing coalition. As one U.S. negotiator explained, "No Khmer Rouge, no
deal." The Khmer Rouge, fiercely anti-Vietnamese, still harbored dreams of
seizing territory from Vietnam. This harmonized with U.S. goals in the
region, also fiercely anti-Vietnamese. A Hun Sen government in Cambodia
friendly to Vietnam was impermissible. Vietnam had to be isolated, even
if it meant risking the return to power of executioners in Cambodia. Only
Khmer Rouge intransigence failed to bring about the realization of the
Western demand for the inclusion of Khmer Rouge officials in the government.
Preferring to continue the guerrilla struggle, the Khmer Rouge hoped to grab
sole control of governing reins through force of arms.
As Cambodian government troops closed in on the last remnants of Khmer
Rouge forces in March 1998, Khmer Rouge warlord Ta Mok communicated an offer
through Thai military channels to turn the Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, over
to the United States. Taken by surprise, U.S. officials turned down the
offer. No desire for a tribunal here. They didn't want him. But Cambodia
wanted him, so the U.S. had to act to prevent that eventuality. The U.S.
needed time to structure proceedings, presumably in order to ensure that the
American role in support of Pol Pot would not surface during a trial. While
U.S. officials worked on arrangements for a trial on their terms, Pol Pot
committed suicide.
Following the final defeat of the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian government
announced that Khmer Rouge leaders would be tried for crimes against
humanity. Without delay, the U.S. responded by demanding that any trial be
conducted solely under United Nations auspices, in other words, under terms
dictated by the U.S. After lengthy wrangling, Western threats and pressure
forced Cambodia to relent and seek a compromise in which the trials would be
conducted in Cambodia, but with a mix of Cambodian and Western prosecutors
and judges. A major sticking point is whether the controlling majority will
be Cambodian or Western. In response to a hostile letter sent from UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan in April 2000, Hun Sen announced that the Khmer
Rouge trials would not be limited to the years in which it held power, but
would cover the entire period of 1970 to 1999. This touched directly on th
e worst fears of U.S. officials, spanning events from the CIA-backed
military coup in Cambodia in 1970 through the final years of Western support
for the Khmer Rouge. Only a hastily drawn American plan for evenly divided
prosecution and judicial teams brought an agreement on the trial, ensuring
that only the events of Khmer Rouge power would be considered. The
Cambodians also had reason to worry. Their justifiable fear was that a
prosecution team with a Western majority would seize the opportunity to seek
the arrest of Hun Sun and other Cambodian People's Party (CPP) leaders on
trumped-up charges. The elimination of the CPP from the scene and the
installation of a government more amenable to Western dictate has long been
a Western goal. Clearly the U.S. motivation is to steer any trials in a
direction favorable to its interests.
Despite apparent agreement, Western insistence on majority control
continues. When Hun Sen announced that a draft law on the conduct of the
trial would be passed by August 2001, Kofi Annan fired off a threatening
letter, demanding full adherence to all Western demands. Unbowed, Hun Sen
responded, "It seems to me that the UN does not want Cambodia to proceed
with the trial, so I want Kofi Annan to be careful with the sovereignty and
the independence of a nation, and let's talk straight and be clear with each
other. I am afraid of nobody. This is a Cambodian issue. To join us or
not is up to you."
In August 1995, Croatian troops invaded Serbian Krajina. Within days,
virtually the entire Serbian population, over 200,000 people, was driven
from their homes. U.S. NATO warplanes spearheaded the assault, bombing
Serbian radar and anti-aircraft sites. American EA-6B Electronic Warfare
aircraft jammed Serb military communications. Croatian troops, trained and
supplied with weapons and satellite reconnaissance by the U.S., rampaged
through the Krajina, burning down homes and slaughtering thousands who
couldn't escape in time. It was the single greatest refugee crisis of the
1991-95 Balkan civil war, and it was U.S. officials who gave the go-ahead to
the Croatian government. Serbian Krajina was closely associated with
Yugoslavia, the last remaining socialist-led government in Europe, and
decidedly outside the orbit of Western control.
In March 1998, the secessionist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was a
small force with about 300 members. Turing a blind eye to the KLA's policy
of murder and intimidation, the U.S., Germany and Great Britain sent arms
shipments and provided training to the KLA, building it up into a major
guerrilla army with as many as 30,000 members. Western intervention turned
a small conflict into a major crisis. As a pretext, NATO relied on the
crisis it had created in order to justify waging a war of aggression against
Yugoslavia. Foremost among crimes against humanity is the crime against
peace, and for this crime NATO and Western leaders clearly bear guilt.
Every town and city in Yugoslavia was the target of their bombs. My travels
throughout Yugoslavia shortly after the war confirmed that NATO deliberately
targeted civilians. Entire residential areas were wiped out. Factories,
schools, hospitals, bridges, apartment buildings, houses, offices and a
passenger train were destroyed. Cluster bombs, anti-personnel in nature,
were dropped on residential areas, tearing human beings to pieces. Over
2,000 civilians were killed and over 10,000 wounded by NATO.
Western leaders could not sell the war to their publics by revealing
that it was intended to create a market friendly to Western corporate
interests, so they concocted the lie of concern for Albanian human rights.
When NATO bombs started falling, Serbian extremists became enraged, blaming
Albanians for the bombs. Right-wing paramilitary squads formed, venting
their rage on Albanian civilians in mainly border areas of Kosovo. Rogue
police and criminal gangs, both Serbian and Albanian, took advantage of the
chaos to loot homes and drive away occupants. Yugoslav security forces, the
target of NATO bombs, struggled to stabilize the situation. By the third
week of the war, they were escorting Albanian refugees back to their homes,
and within two months order had been restored to most of Kosovo. Yugoslav
security forces fought against the terrorism of both the KLA and Serbian
paramilitaries, and by the end of the war had arrested over 800 Serbian
extremists for crimes against Albanian civilians.
President Milosevic's position was consistent. He advocated ethnic
equality. His delegation at Rambouillet peace talks consisted of members of
every ethnic group in Kosovo, including Albanian. Serbs were a minority in
the Yugoslav delegation. At the talks, the Yugoslav delegation offered
wide-ranging autonomy for Kosovo. Repeatedly, Milosevic stated his
commitment to a multi-ethnic society. His words from a 1992 speech are
typical: "We know that there are many Albanians in Kosovo who do not
approve of the separatist policy of their nationalist leaders. They are
under pressure, intimidated, and blackmailed, but we shall not respond with
the like. We must respond by offering our hand, living with them in
equality, and not permitting that a single Albanian child, woman, or man be
discriminated against in Kosovo in any way. We must, for the sake of all
Serbian citizens, insist on the policy of brotherhood, unity, and ethnic
equality in Kosovo. We shall persevere on this policy." A monumental
propaganda campaign has succeeded in achieving one of the most astounding
smear campaigns in history, painting a democrat devoted to socialist ideals
as a racist hate-monger.
Milosevic's offense was his opposition to privatization and foreign
control of the Yugoslav economy. The U.S.-organized Balkan Stability Pact
called for a region under the sway of the free market model. Yugoslavia,
strategically positioned along the Danube and astride a major highway
transportation route, stood in the way of the effort to place the Balkans
under complete and total Western economic domination.
The common thread running through these examples is not a zeal for
justice and human rights by the West, but a vindictive urge to seek the
imprisonment or murder of its opponents. Nothing can stand in the way of
corporate profits. As one man in Yugoslavia told me, " I think our
President Milosevic is more of a problem for imperialism than for us."
Who can believe that Milosevic could possibly receive a fair trial at
the hands of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY)? He wasn't even allowed to speak at his arraignment without having
his microphone twice switched off. During NATO's war against Yugoslavia,
the Tribunal hastily composed its indictment of Milosevic and four other
Yugoslav leaders in order to bolster sagging public support for the war.
Created and funded by the same Western powers that carried out NATO's war,
the ICTY serves its master. The trial is widely, and rightly, seen as
setting an important precedent. No longer would international law be an
impediment to action. Already the war established that Western powers could
wage war without authorization by the United Nations. The trial will
establish their right to seize anyone without regard to borders or legal
niceties. Anyone resisting Western demands would be threatened with
abduction and imprisonment. It will be yet another tool for imposing
Western domination over other nations, and make no mistake, it will be used.
The trial of Slobodan Milosevic will be a show trial with a preordained
verdict.
The real war criminals are not on trial. They act as judge and jury.
We are witnessing the outrageous spectacle of criminals judging their
victims. President Milosevic's only crime was that he had the courage to
stand up to NATO despite overwhelming odds, to patriotically defend his
country against aggression. Shortly after the war, I was a member of a
delegation that interviewed Albanian refugees who fled to Belgrade. Among
those we interviewed was Fatmir Seholi, Chief Editor at Radio Television
Pristina until NATO troops entered Kosovo and expelled him from the
province. Unlike those in the West deluded by propaganda, he knew a real
war criminal when he saw one. "Every NATO bombing was a big problem," he
told us. "There was no purpose relating to the Serbian nation or the
Albanian nation. Whether that was their purpose or not, people were killed.
The man who could command NATO to bomb people is not human. He is an
animal. After the bombing at Djakovica, I saw decapitated bodies. I have
pictures of that. It is horrible, terrible. I saw people without arms,
without feet." Seholi demanded, "Who is Clinton to accuse another? I
would like to say to Hillary Clinton that her husband is an immoral person.
That man ruined our state for no reason. What would he say if someone
bombed the United States, bombed the White House, or killed or raped his
daughter? Who is the evil man here? Milosevic, who is protecting the
territory of Yugoslavia and protecting the people of Kosovo, or Clinton, who
bombs us?"

Enemy's enemy = a friend?
by Samuel Thursday August 30, 2001 at 10:53 AM
samuel.edquist@hist.uu.se

Milosevic is an extreme nationalist, just as Tudjman and UCK. NATO and western media has been lying about the conflict, but don't respond to that by constructing another myth, that makes Milosevic and his regime into the good guy.