\"I do not know
what to say
anymore, or who to write to. We wrote to Kofi Anan, we wrote to
Mary Robinson,
we wrote to the whole world but no one seems to care.We hear from
friends
who live in the States and Europe that things in Palestine have
quieted
down, they do not know that raids continue, killing of innocent
people
continues and homes of so many families are destroyed.\" --
Marina Barham,
an internet letter from bombarded Beit Jala, December 5.
Israel, largely
followed by
Western media, describes its handling of the Palestinian uprising
as a
war of defence: The Palestinians are violent non-compromising,
fanatic
people, who reject Israel\'s generous peace offers. Whatever you
give them,
they always want more - maximalists who are determined to kill
their children
for just a few centimeters of what they view as their land. In
their real
essence they are terrorists, and their true goal is to throw all
the Jews
to the sea. As Barak put it - \"I have not yet managed to
understand from
Arafat that he is willing to acknowledge the existence of the
state of
Israel\" (Ha\'aretz, Hana Kim, Nov 10).
But let us just
stop and recall.
These are the same Palestinians who seven years ago still offered
their
hands to peace with Israel. September 1993 was for most
Palestinians a
month of euphoria and optimism. Members of the PLO Hawks - the
local military
units of the PLO - returned their arms, and were interviewed in
Israeli
tv speaking of the new era of peace, of living side by side as
good neighbors.
There was much talk about how similar and close these two peoples
are.
There was a real feeling that a new page is opened, and the past
will be
forgiven.
That was the climax
of a process
that started long before in the Palestinian society. For years,
there were
two lines: the one was that the Palestinians should not settle
for anything
less than regaining the whole of Palestine, and even \'let the
Jews be thrown
to the sea\'; the other called for a solution based on recognizing
the rights
of both nations, and emphasized the need to find a model for
coexistance
between the two peoples. From the Palestinian perspective,
accepting the
idea of two states, was an enormous concession, which means
giving up most
of their historical homeland. (The West bank and Gaza strip on
which the
Palestinian state was to be formed comprise together only 22% of
the historical
Palestine.)
Even in the worst
periods of
oppression in the occupied territories, when their position was
far from
popular, and some accused them as collaborators, the secular
leadership
of the local PLO institutions, as well as independent
intellectuals, human
rights activists and workers unions were calling for cooperation
with the
Israeli peace forces which opposed the occupation.
The six years of
the first Palestinian
Intifada (87-93) convinced the majority in Israel that the
occupation is
unfeasible. Combined with the victory of the reconciliation line
in the
Palestinian society, many people felt that a serious two-state
solution
might be realistic for the first time. September 1993 was a
euphoric month
also for many in Israel. The dominant public perception was that
the occupation
is over and a Palestinian state is on its way. The right wing and
the settlers
reacted with true panic, and the rest - with a new, almost
unfamiliar,
sense of optimism. The first couple of months after Oslo, most
Israelis
beleived that the settlements are going to be dismantled, and
prices of
appartments in central Israel jumped high up in expectation for
the wave
of moved settlers. Nevertheless, two third of the Israelis
supported Oslo
in the polls.
But that\'s not how
it turned
out. Seven years have passed and we are back to far worse than it
ever
was before. Let us just look at what happened in the Gaza strip.
This is
particularly revealing, since Gaza is the one area regarding
which there
was substantial consensus in Israeli society before Oslo. One
million people
in one of the most densely populated and poorest areas of the
world, with
hardly any water or natural resources - \'What do we need Gaza
for?\'- was
a common question in Israel for years.
Nevertheless,
Israel insisted
in the Oslo accords that no settlement in Gaza will be
dismantled, at least
in the \"interim period\" of five years. Rabin\'s insistence was not
driven
by popular pressure. Many of the settlers in the more isolated
settlements
wanted, in fact, to leave at the time, and demanded compensations
for alternative
housing. But Rabin refused, even when the Dugit settlers camped
for weeks
in protest in front of his offices.
What followed was
worse. In
the Taba negotiations just a month after the White-House
ceremony, Israel
presented its actual maps for Gaza, which left much more than the
settlements
under full Israeli control. Israel insisted that the settlements
will be
grouped in three blocs which include also the lands between the
individual
settlements. These blocs amount, together with a rich network of
bypass
roads, to over a third of the land in Gaza strip. The Palestinian
negotiators
responded with what appeared as shock and anger. Nabil Shaat
described
the proposal as a \"Swiss cheese\" plan for the cantonization of
Gaza. The
Palestinian delegation left in protest, and it seemed like the
crisis is
serious (\'Ha\'aretz\', 3.11.93).
But two weeks
later, in talks
in Cairo in 18.11.93, the Palestinian negotiators accepted fully
all these
Israeli demands. That first sweeping Palestinian surrender marked
the beginning
of a long series of negotiations at which Israel dictated, and
Arafat protested,
cried, and signed.
The process at
which a leader
of a national liberation movement is broken into collaboration is
a long
and complex one. At the eve of Oslo, Arafat\'s grip on the
territories was
deteriorating (as well as his grip in the refugee camps on
Lebanon, and
on Jordan). In the occupied territories, there were daily
complaints and
protests regarding the corruption of his Tunis aids, his
undemocratic rule,
and his sole control of the finances. The local Palestinian
delegation
headed by Haidar Abd-el Shafi was gaining much more respect in
the territories
than Arafat\'s anachronistic administration. A major victory was
the only
thing that could still save him and the Oslo agreement may have
seemed
first as such a victory. However, Arafat\'s shaky position was
obvious also
to the Israeli side. Rabin may have started the Oslo move as a
necessary
response to the changing public opinion in Israel, which was
getting tired
of the occupation. But he could not resist the opportunity,
provided by
Arafat\'s weakness, of turning this unique historical moment into
a new
form of Israeli domination.
The situation in
Gaza today
is that six thousand Israeli settlers occupy about a third of the
area
(including the military bases and bypass roads) and one million
Palestinians
are squeezed in the other two thirds. Surrounded by electronic
fences and
military posts, tightly sealed from the outside world, the
Palestinian
Gaza has turned long ago into a huge prison ghetto. The standard
of living
in Gaza which already before was among the lowest in the world,
has deteriorated
sharply since Oslo. Until Oslo, it was possible for Palestinian
Gaza residents
to obtain exit permits. Since Oslo, they are not even allowed to
visit
their relatives in the West Bank, and only the lucky few carried
exit permits
for work in Israel.
Possibly, Israel
intended to
allow the Palestinians, in some future, to call their prisons
\'the Palestinian
state\', but its situation would remain the same. If the prisoners
try to
rebel, as is happening now, the internal roads are blocked and
they are
divided into smaller prison units each surrounded by Israeli
tanks. They
can be bombarded from the air, with nowhere to escape, their food
supply,
electricity, fuel, all controlled by Israel and cut at the will
of the
prison guards. They are given one choice: accept prison life, or
perish.
Israel\'s efforts
have focused
on extending the Gaza arrangement also to the West Bank. Already,
the Palestinians
areas are split into four enclaves isolated from each other, and
surrounded
by settlements, IDF posts and bypass Israeli roads. Many Israeli
settlements
form already massive blocs, ready for annexation, though, there
are also
many isolated settlements in the midst of Palestinian
population.
Much propaganda
effort was devoted
to emphasize Barak\'s alleged generous offer to the Palestinians
in Camp
David. The story goes that Israel will annex formally now all the
settlements
blocs (but not the isolated settlements). This would still leave
the Palestinians
with 90 percent of the West Bank, according to Israeli media at
the time
of Camp David (though other figures ranging from 85 to 97 have
been also
floating in the media since).
We should note
first, that the
stories about what Barak offered in the \'Camp David
understandings\' of
July 2000 come with no information to substantiate them. As
pointed out
by Akiva Eldar, a senior analyst of \'Ha\'aretz\' \"Hardly anyone has
any idea
what those understandings are. No one has seen the paper
summarizing these
understandings, because no such paper exists. Veteran diplomats
cannot
recall political talks whose content was not put down on paper\"
(Eldar,
\"On the basis of the nonexistent Camp David understandings\",
\'ha\'aretz\',
Nov 16, 00).
What has gone
completely unnoted
is that in practice, the Palestinians no longer own or have any
access
to at least 50% of the land of the West Bank. These are, first,
the lands
which were confiscated already during the occupation as Israeli
\'state
lands\'. On these lands there are 37 Israeli settlements - \"21
isolated
settlements, plus 16 more settlements which are not fully linked
to Israeli
settlements blocs\" (\'ha\'aretz, 21.2.00, page A3). Although it is
announced
that they will not be formally annexed presently, no plan to
dismantle
them has been announced either. The common description in Israeli
media
is that their residents will be free to choose whether to
dislocate or
to stay as Israeli citizens living in the \'Palestinian state\'.
Based on
past experience, this means that not only will they stay, but
these settlements
will be expanded. The state lands include not only the
settlements themselves,
but also the hills surrounding them, some of which are occupied
by a single
settlers\' caravan. Other parts of the presumed \'Palestinian
state\', are
large IDF military and \'fire zones\' areas, particularly in the
Jordan valley.
Israel has made it clear these will remain military areas, as
required
by \'security needs\'.(E.g. in a meeting with settleres from the
Jordan Valley
\"Barak told them that in any settlement [with the Palestinians]
Israel
would maintain a \'security and community foothold\' in the area\".
(Jerusalem
Post, 29.9.00)
This means, then,
that if Israel
annexes now 10 percent of the land, \'leaving the Palestinian
state with
90 percent of the West Bank\', 40 percent of their \'state\' are
areas owned
and fully controlled by Israel - areas in which they are not
allowed to
build, settle, do agriculture, and, in the case of the large
military areas
in the Jordan valley, they are not even allowed to pass there.
In fact, these
details correspond
to another Israeli plan, on which, unlike the alleged Camp David
plan,
some more detailed information was provided in the Israeli media,
since
at least March 2000. This is the same plan that Barak is
announcing again
these days, as his newest \'peace initiative\'. The front page of
\'ha\'aretz\'
10.3.00 announced \"The prime minister\'s 10-40-50 plan: 50 percent
of the
west bank for the Palestinians, 40 percent under debate, and 10
percent
to Israel\". The plan includes a third redeployment which will
increase
the A area from the current 42 percents of areas A and B, to 50
percent,in
which the Palestinians will be allowed to declare a state with a
capital
in Abu Dis. \"The proposal will leave unresolved the status of
about 40
percent of the west bank, as well as Jerusalem and the right of
return\",said
the text. That is, in return for his consent to the formal
annexation of
the whole center of the west bank by Israel, Arafat will be
allowed to
declare a Palestinian state on 50 percent of the west bank, and
to sell
to his people that the rest of the problems are still being
discussed.
The plan itself is
all too well
known: it is one of the versions of the Alon plus plan, or the
Sharon plan,
which robs the Palestinians of half of the west bank lands. The
only variation
is that it applies in stages: 10 percent are formally annexed
now, and
the formal excecution of the rest is still postponed for future
\'bargaining\'.
If there was any
content behind
the \"big concession\" story of Camp David, it might be that the
\'areas of
debate\' would not be publically mentioned, creating the
(undocumented and
inofficial) impression that the Palestinians will be allowed to
claim some
sort of potential future sovereignty over these lands that they
have no
access to. The PA negotiators, on their part, contribute to the
smoke screen
around Israel\'s offers, as they always have. They have been doing
their
best to hide from their people how little they managed to gain
after seven
years of negotiations.
The crisis with the
right-wing
in Israel at the eve of the Camp David summit contributed further
to the
false impression that Barak made an unprecedented offer. The
fringe rightwing
always objects to any plan that leaves the Palestinians with any
amount
of their land. In their eyes, transfer is the only solution. But
the rest
were perhaps also victims of the same propaganda. In the absence
of any
information of what was offered in Camp David, how can they be
sure that
Barak, or the media fed by his aids, are lying when they say he
offered
to give back 90 percent of the territories, including some parts
of Jerusalem?
Anyway, right wing fury always helps to substantiate the
proraganda. Today
they are protesting about Barak\'s \'restraint\' in oppressing the
upreisal.
Just as in the case
of Gaza,
Barak\'s big \'concession\' was that he declared he might consider
allowing
the Palestinians to call their collection of isolated prisons a
\'Palestinian
state\'. South Africa, at the peak of Apartheid, offered the same
to the
blacks in the Bantustans. It even sought UN recognition of these
Bantustans
as independent states.
Seven years after
Oslo, nothing
is left of the hopes and dreams that so many attached to it. Once
again,
Israel had a historical opportunity to reach a just peace with
the Palestinian
people, and to integrate in the Middle East. Instead, it turned
this to
another chapter of oppression and control. It was obvious that
the situation
in the territories might eventually turn explosive, as the
Palestinian
people realize that all Israel offers after years of humiliating
negotiations
is just more vague promises that are never kept. It is hard to
find an
account for this policy of Israel, other than that it was not
willing to
give up the occupied territories, with their land and water
resources.
Even more
intriguing is Israel\'s
part in the present escalation. Whatever his intentions were,
Barak triggered
the current explosion, by turning the conflict into a religious
one. In
all previously announced plans for the final agreement (like the
Beilin
Abu-Mazen plan) the \'Mount temple\'-El Aksa site was supposed to
remain
in \"ex- territorial Palestinian Sovereignty\". But in the Camp
David summit,
Barak demanded that the Palestinians will give up even this
symbolic form
of sovereignty. Next, Barak not only allowed Sharon\'s provocative
\'visit\'
of the site, but he sent along hundreds of soldiers who started
shooting
at the first signs of protest. When this triggered further
demonstrations
the next day (as could be expected) Barak escalated the shooting,
and eventually
moved Israeli forces and tanks into densely populated Palestinian
areas.
By all indications, it seems likely that the escalation of the
protest
into armed clashes could have been prevented had the Israeli
response been
more restrained.
For years, many in
Israel have
understood that when people are driven to despair, there is no
way to prevent
individual acts of terror, or suicidal bombings. Rather than
aiming at
restoring, first, some calm, Israel\'s brutality drives more
Palestinians
to despair. In the Palestinian society, just like in Israel,
there is some
tension between the secular and the fanatic religious poles. The
secular,
democratic and liberal opponents of the occupation, who set the
public
tone at the eve of Oslo, are still calling for co-existence, for
a civil
democratic struggle, and for cooperating with Israelis who oppose
the occupation.
In February 2000,
hundred and
twenty Palestinian intellectuals, including Haider Abd-el Shafi,
issued
a message addressed to the Israeli and Jewish public. \"The
majority of
Palestinians, including the undersigned, believed that the time
was ripe
for concluding with the Israelis a historic agreement\", they
open, but
instead, \"the historic settlement is becoming a settlement
between Israelis
themselves, not a settlement with the Palestinians\". That\'s
because at
the present, the balance of power is in Israel\'s favor. \"It is
clear that
the Palestinian negotiator, whose hands are tied by the
overwhelming balance
of power working against him, may be coerced into accepting a
humiliating
and degrading settlement\". But, they warn, \"the settlement the
Israeli
leadership is seeking to impose on the Palestinian negotiator
could not
be a settlement with the Palestinian people... We will neither
support
nor accept it\". The alternative they propose is a joint anti
occupation
struggle: \"We extend our hand to you to make a real and just
peace, not
the militarist peace of coercion, the generals peace\".
(\'Ha\'aretz, 13.3.00).
This month, in the
midst of
fire, the same group has issued a second \"urgent call to the
Israeli public\"
stressing again their firm belief \"in an equitable and just
negotiated
peace between Israelis and Palestinians that recognizes the right
to self-determination\".
\"However\", they continue \"we, like our communities, have lost
hope in the
possibility of resolving the current inequities in the framework
of the
Oslo agreements and the exclusive American brokerage of the
process. Instead,
negotiatins must be based (among other) on the principles \"that
the lands
occupied by Israel in 1967 are, in fact, occupied territories and
that
peace will be only be achieved by ending the occupation of these
territories\"
and that \"Israel\'s recognition of culpability in the creation of
the Palestinian
refugees in 1948 is a pre-requisite to finding a just and lasting
resolution
of the refugee problem\".
Close attention
should be paid
to what these sane and sober voices say: \"We are deeply concerned
over
the fact that the conflict has dangerously spiraled, at times,
into an
ethnic/religious one, as the pogroms against Arab citizens of
Nazareth,
the lynching of the two Israeli soldiers in Ramallah and the
numerous mob
attacks on synagogues and mosques have shown. The profoundly
irresponsible
and self-serving act of the Barak government in allowing Ariel
Sharon onto
the Haram al Sharif shows not just an alarming lack of judgement,
but also
a total disregard for Palestinian, Arab and Muslim sensibilities.
The use
of live ammunition against unarmed civilians also shows total
contempt
for Palestinian life. The refusal to address the underlying
causes of the
demonstrations and the stubborn use of force to put them down,
simply play
into the hands of the irrational forces of religious and ethnic
hatred
on both sides, dangerously leading us to a situation in which the
future
co-existence of our peoples might become inconceivable\".
In an interview
with Amira Hass
in Ha\'aretz (17.11.00) some of them express their worry that the
Israeli
media \"emphasizes and exploits\" fanatic religious calls in
funerals, or
in the Palestinian media, in an attempt to depict the whole
Palestinian
community as fanatic and blood thirsty, and, thus, justify
Israel\'s use
of brutal force.
Israel, indeed, is
depicting
itself as the side being brutally attacked, engaged in a self
defence war
- another round of David\'s battle against almighty Goliath, who
threatens
now its mere existence. \"The deputy chief of staff, Major General
Moshe
Ya\'alon told his colleagues that this was Israel\'s most critical
campaign
against the Palestinians, including Israel\'s Arab population,
since the
1948 war - for him, in fact, it is the second half of 1948\" (Amir
Oren
\"Truth or consequence\", Ha\'aretz Nov 17, 2000). In the \'first
half\' of
1948, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were driven to exile
and their
villages ruined, leaving pre 1967 Israel relatively \'Arab free\'.
Ya\'alon
is among Barak\'s closest security consultants. (\'Ha\'aretz,
there). It is
hard to avoid the impression that not much has changed in Israel
since
1948, and the dominant military and political circles are eager
and ready
for \"the second half\".
There is no country
in the Western
world, where the political and the military arms intertwine so
closely
as in Israel, particularly in the Labor branch of politics. Many
of the
Labor prime ministers and high officials came directly from the
army, and
the close bonds formed there continue to effect decisions when
roles are
switched. Barak\'s direct route from the chief of staff to chief
of state
is just the latest example. A common pattern is that when a Labor
general
turns prime-minister, he assumes the role of the peace-seeking
moderate,
while the army\'s chief of staff is the \'bad guy\' exerting
pressure for
a more aggressive line. Thus, in the early Oslo negotiations,
when Rabin
was the prime minister, Barak as chief of staff was the one who
insisted
on \'security demands\', to which the peace-maker had to yield. Now
Barak
is the peace maker, \'pushed\' by the army.
And so, carrying
for ever the
torch of \'peace\', they can go undisturbed with their work of
systematic
destruction. Contrary to calming Israeli announcements, the
Palestinian
communities are still under siege, with food and medicine
supplies sharply
declining, and actual starvation looming. Civilians and children
are still
shot, many in the head or eyes; neighborhoods are being bombarded
with
heavy machine guns or missiles, lands are swept, trees plunked.
This happens
daily. It is hardly reported, but those who want to know, can
find it all
in the desperate stream of Palestinian reports in the internet.
An extensive
coverage of the
history of occupation and the Oslo agreements can be found in
Noam Chomsky\'s
-World Orders Old
and New, (Columbia
U press), and epilogue in the 1996 edition.