“De Verenigde Staten en Europa hadden ‘slachtoffers’ nodig om hun oorlog te voeren” 
“We hadden het terrorisme uitgeschakeld” 
“De Verenigde Staten en Europa hadden ‘slachtoffers’ nodig om hun oorlog te voeren” 
“During the entire previous decade, there were very few attacks (by the KLA), and then (…) from the beginning of 1998 until just before the NATO aggression, 1.068 attacks were launched against individuals, citizens only, that is to say, about 100 times more than in any one of the previous years. 
Everybody was a target, including Kosovo Albanians, especially those who were employed in the government; that is to say, people who were employed in post offices, clerks who worked in government offices, et cetera. This time members of the terrorist organisation KLA killed, in a brutal way, 387 citizens. Out of this number, 75 citizens were ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins, and 196 were ethnic Albanians; that is to say, the Albanian terrorists killed two and a half times more Albanians than Serbs, in order to subjugate them, in order to force them to follow their policy. Also, 15 members of other minorities were killed, primarily the Romany. (…) In February 1998, the American ambassador in Macedonia called the KLA a terrorist organisation. (p396) 

“We hadden het terrorisme uitgeschakeld” 
“In August and September 1998, the military and police forces practically neutralised the KLA terrorists and their strongholds. And when, in the autumn of 1998, terrorism had been neutralised, and when they were handing in their weapons in tractorfuls to police stations; when the local police, a separate local police had been formed in hundreds of Albanian villages under our auspices and sponsorship, and we had imagined it so that the Albanian villagers themselves should select local policemen who would be given a uniform and a pistol from the state and everything else a policeman should have to take care of law and order in his village, they themselves selected their policemen. In hundreds of villages such local police was established, and terrorism had been virtually totally defeated, weapons had been handed in, a local police had been established, and things were going back to normal. 
And then Holbrooke (Amerikaans gezant, nvdr) came back again and his delegation. Long negotiations; for 12 days I think they went on, because he demanded observers, military presence, and so on. And I said to him then, "You're not really interested in the Albanians at all. You have another objective," and he asked me which. And I said to him, "To confirm America's leading role in Europe and to confirm America's leading role in NATO." And he said, "Yes, that is our interest." 
(…) That is when sponsorship was taken over over the terrorists. And a verification commission was formed, and as it was the OSCE(1), we trusted it; but whose task was obviously to manufacture a justification for a war against Yugoslavia, because the people they protected, their terrorists, proved uncapable of doing it. They had been completely defeated and widely condemned by the Albanian masses. 
With the formation of that mission, and obviously encouraged by such a development, the Albanian terrorists, at the end of 1998, continued to commit crimes in an even more brutal and widespread manner. (pag 396-402) 
There were no deportations or discrimination that the verification commission could have registered. It is being forgotten that in each incident that occurred during the operation of the verification commission, a report was drawn up because there was a state commission of the federal government for cooperation with the OSCE mission. There is not a single report testifying to this, but I know that there are even decisions of German courts which rejected complaints by Albanian emigres requesting asylum based on political persecution in Kosovo, that said that there was no evidence that there was any kind of persecution of Albanians in Kosovo, and that is why their requests were rejected. 
That was the largest verification commission ever since the OSCE was founded. It consisted of 2.000 people. In addition, an enormous staff of the international commission for refugees, the UNHCR, plus the observer mission, plus the Red Cross staff, plus hundreds of journalists accredited there, so that thousands of people were marching up and down Kosovo. And nothing could be concealed from them. 
If there han been any such act, they wouldn't have had to make up the so called Racak massacre. They would have used such a misdeed as a trigger for further operations. But there was no such act, and that is why this conflict between a police unit and the terrorist unit in Racak was used as an excuse and an allegation of Serb forces against civilians. (pag410-411) 
This all shows the situation in Kosovo and Metohija and how it was used as a means to fan the flames of a crisis and to lead in that crisis. We are talking about the use of terrorism in order to realise the strategic goals of the USA and NATO in southeastern Europe, and the example was Kosovo and Metohija. (pag 405) 

Citaten zijn afkomstig van de officiële verslagen van de verdediging van Milosevic op 14, 15 en 18 februari 2002. Ze zijn terug te vinden op www.ICTY.org onder ‘Transcripts’. Citaten zijn uittreksels uit de letterlijke transcripties van (de Engelse vertaling van) deze eerste uiteenzetting van ex-president Milosevic, waarvan de pagina’s zijn genummerd van 225 tot 509.

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