16 July 2002
BELGIUM MUST REJECT FABRICATION OF PLUTONIUM “MOX” FOR U.S. WEAPONS
PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION PROGRAM, JOIN WITH GERMANY IN SUPPORTING PRO-DISARMAMENT
OPTION - IMMOBILIZATION OF PLUTONIUM AS WASTE
The Government of Belgium is faced with a critical choice as it this week considers its role in the
program being carried out by the United States and Russia program to “dispose” of surplus weapons
plutonium. In a strong gesture of support for global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Belgium
must reject a policy advocating manufacture in Belgium of test fuel for weapons plutonium
disposition and affirm the safest, cheapest and most proliferation-resistant alternative –
immobilization of plutonium as waste. By rejecting manufacture of plutonium test fuel, Belgium has
before it an opportunity to internationally lead the way in development of plutonium immobilization
technology, a technology which will have increasing opportunities for application in the management of
both military and commercial plutonium.
The issue at hand involves pressure by the Bush Administration on Belgium to agree to the
fabrication in Belgium of mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel (MOX) “lead test assemblies” (LTAs)
made from 150 kilograms of U.S. weapons-grade plutonium. As part of the U.S-Russian program to each
“dispose” of 34 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons plutonium, the plutonium would be shipped to Europe,
perhaps as early as July 2003, via land and sea from the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Los Alamos
nuclear weapons laboratory in New Mexico, causing an extreme security risk along the transport routes.
Documents obtained from the DOE under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) indicate
that manufacture of the MOX pellets is being considered for Belgnoculeaire’s P0 facility at Dessel, with
fuel assembly at Framatome’e FBFC facility. This program is being called the “Eurofab Alternative,” as
it is an alternative to fabrication of the LTAs in a MOX plant planned in the U.S. but still only on the
drawing board. Return shipment of the MOX assemblies could take place around January 2004.
If carried out without any problems, four LTAs would be shipped back to the U.S. and irradiated
in a U.S. nuclear reactor in order to attempt to confirm, for the very first time, the viability of MOX made
from weapons plutonium. The program could only be carried out if export and import licenses were
secured from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and if the U.S. reactor (McGuire Unit 2) received
a proper NRC license amendment, which the NRC has said would take a year to review. (See
http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/MOX/licensing.html.) Those licenses are sure to face formal
intervention by environmental and disarmament groups in the U.S. and issuance of them delayed or
stopped.
The U.S. and Russia entered into an agreement in September 2000 to each dispose of 34 MT of
plutonium. The U.S. chose to follow a “dual track” disposition program utilizing both MOX and
immobilization of plutonium in high-level nuclear waste. The U.S. established the policy that the goal of
the program was not energy generation but to get the plutonium into a waste form just as radioactive as
spent nuclear fuel. This so-called “spent fuel standard” was defined by the National Academy of
Sciences and remains U.S. policy. Russia has argued that its plutonium has value and should be used as a
fuel, but it is very clear that plutonium both in Russia and the U.S. has no value and is a severe
proliferation and environmental liability and must be dealt with as such. According to U.S.
environmental, non-proliferation and disarmament organizations, immobilization of this plutonium as
waste would be the best disposal option from a disarmament perspective.2
It is unclear if decision-makers in Belgium have taken time to carefully review the problems now
faced in implementing the U.S.-Russia plutonium disposition program and how the program as now being
proposed could have serious negative non-proliferation effects. In particular, the program could be the
way that Russia establishes a long-lasting “plutonium fuel cycle” which could result in more plutonium
production and proliferation in the future. And, in the U.S., the program is being seen by some as a way
to get the U.S. into the reprocessing business. More and more, the program has drifted away from its
original and worthy goal of getting rid of plutonium and now appears to be a project which the plutonium
industry has hijacked as yet another way to further its own dangerous and costly goals.
An in-depth study of the plutonium disposition program by the Government of Belgium,
with Parliamentary and public input, must be conducted before any legitimate decision can be
made concerning participation in the LTA program. This review should include a request to the U.S.
for all pertinent documents and information. A review of the program will reveal a number of troubling
problems and inconsistencies, as well as surprising information:
Operational Basis for the Russian MOX Program has Ended with Dismantlement of Germany’s
Hanau MOX Plant – For the last few years, the basis for carrying out a MOX program in Russia was the
export from Germany of the never-utilized Siemens MOX plant at Hanau. Key equipment of the plant
was to be packaged and shipped to Russia to be used for MOX production but it has been reported in the
media (Nuclear Fuel, June 10, 2002) that the Hanau plant is now being dismantled and that equipment is
being shipped to Japan. At the same time, Germany, which supports funding of only the immobilization
option in Russia, allowed a German-French-Russia agreement for development of MOX in Russia to
expire at the end of its 5-year life on June 1, 2002, effectively ending German cooperation on Russian
MOX. The G-8 simply could not come up with the money for the Hanau plant in time to avoid action by
Siemens to dismantle the Hanau MOX plant. A December 2001 DOE-Ministry of Atomic Energy
(Minatom) document assessing the cost of the Russian program based the cost estimate for the Russian
program solely on the Hanau option and considered no other possibilities. The cost of any Russian MOX
program will shoot up dramatically if a new MOX plant has to be built, yet it appears that MOX
advocates have intentionally presented costs based on a false assumption. A new cost document is
essential but has not been forthcoming.
Russia Aims to Use the Program to Gain New Reactors, with the BN-800 Plutonium Breeder its
Main Goal – Statements by Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and various Russian
physicists makes it very clear that Russia hopes to manipulate the G-7 funders into paying for a BN-800
reactor (or reactors) or other type of expensive reactor. The BN-800 would be capable of producing
weapons-grade plutonium and would meet Russia’s illusion of “closing” the fuel cycle by reuse of
plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, including spent MOX fuel. Such a reactor would create a proliferation
nightmare in Russia and would serve to reverse any program designed to eliminate weapons plutonium.
Some in Russia are advocating a new gas-cooled reactor (Gas Turbine – Modular Helium Reactor), but
the DOE eliminated this option for the U.S. in February as being the most expensive - $6.4 billion - of all
options considered. (See link to DOE report under comments on “immobilization.”) Cost estimates of
the Russian program have been based on use of the aging Soviet-designed VVER-1000 reactors, but
rumors persist, which DOE refuses to clarify, that the reactors are not technically capable of using MOX
without major upgrades at massive expense. New reactors in Russia could easily double or triple the
current cost estimate of around $2 billion. The Russian regulator – GAN – has balked at a license for the
BN-800 design due to safety shortcomings. Minatom must be prevented from using plutonium
disposition as a way to manipulate G-7 funding for new and unnecessary reactors.
Russian and U.S. Programs, which were to be Carried Out in Parallel are Being “Delinked” –
Under Agreement with Russian and policy of the U.S. Congress, the U.S. and Russian programs are to be
carried out in “parallel.” The timetable stipulated in the U.S.-Russia disposition agreement of September
2000 runs in parallel, but it is clear that the Russian program has fallen far behind the U.S. program.
Nonetheless, DOE is attempting to push the U.S. program forward without waiting the see if any program
will ever develop in Russia. In testimony on March 6, 2002 before the U.S. House of Representatives’
Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham stated that the
U.S. program “shouldn’t be further paused pending the financing of the Russian program.” This 3
statement reveals that the intention is no longer to carry out the programs in parallel and that the business
interests of DOE’s contractor – Duke, Cogema, Stone & Webster – have taken over the direction of the
program. Business interests of Belgonucleaire could likewise be of greater of concern than sound
disarmament policy. Meanwhile, the Russian program languishes. A key question that now demands an
answer is if the Russian MOX program, including LTAs, is also at the stage where it is moving forward in
pace with the U.S. The answer is a definitive ‘no’ as it remains unclear if Russia even has sufficient
reactor capacity to use MOX fuel.
MOX in Russian Means More Opportunity for Theft and Diversion of Plutonium – Establishment of
a MOX program in Russia opens up more pathways for theft and diversion of plutonium and from
processing facilities and attack of plutonium shipments and facilities. Logic and experience points to the
fact that processing and handling of plutonium, especially in Russia, should be kept to an absolute
minimum in order to reduce the chances for theft. MOX maximizes opportunities for theft due to many
more transport and processing steps. Immobilization is a concept beautiful for its simplicity and it
minimizes handling and processing of plutonium. Additionally, transport of bulky, highly-radioactive
containers of the immobilized form would be virtually impossible to steal.
G-8 Funding for the Russian Program Has Been Postponed Yet Another Year - At the G-8 Foreign
Ministers meeting in Canada on June 12& 13, 2002, the statement issued at the end of the meeting made
note that the funding mechanism for the Russian program once again was postponed. The statement said
that “With respect to plutonium dispositioning, we affirmed the importance of ensuring that excess
military plutonium is rendered permanently unusable for nuclear weapons. Donors are working to
complete negotiations for a multilateral framework for Russia’s plutonium dispositioning program in
2003.” (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/g8fmm-g8rmae/chair_statement-en.asp) This sounds like an
embarrassing repeat of the statements issued at the end of the Genoa and Okinawa summits and reflects
no progress in funding the Russian MOX program. In late June, the G-8 itself endorsed a hastily prepared
non-proliferation program to be carried out in Russia over 10 years at a cost of $10 billion each from the
U.S. and G-7, but it did not include any specific funds for plutonium disposition and countries retain the
right to prevent funds being spent on projects which are unwise, such as a BN-800 reactor in Russia.
DOE Admits in April 2002 that the U.S. Program Shifts to Long-term Storage – In an amended
decision document (Record of Decision - ROD) of April 19, 2002 (see U.S. Federal Register at
http://www.gpo.gov) for the DOE’s plutonium disposition Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), DOE
both cancelled the cheaper immobilization option and announced “implementation of consolidated long-term
storage at the Savannah River Site” of over 6 MT of plutonium to be transported from another DOE
site. The amended ROD further stated that “no final decisions regarding the MOX portion of the program
will be made until…(environmental) reviews are complete.” Until today, no such reviews have been
conducted, leaving the MOX program in doubt. Such reviews are needed because DOE has not yet
proved that impure plutonium that was going to be immobilized can actually be purified and attempted to
be manufactured into MOX. Likewise, no EIS has been conducted on the shipment of plutonium to
Belgium or the impact of LTA irradiation in the McGuire reactor.
MOX Program Faces Licensing Hurdles - In the U.S., the licensing process fore the MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site currently faces stiff citizen intervention and the license
request for both the LTA irradiation and the bulk use of MOX will be challenged. The MOX consortium
hired by DOE to carry out the program – Duke, Cogema, Stone & Webster – at a minimum faces delays
due to the license challenges. In Russia, the reactor regulator, GAN, is ill-prepared to consider all the
technical problems with MOX use in VVER-1000 reactors or new reactors and it is certain that GAN will
not stand up to Minatom and ensure that a proper license review takes place. MOX use in unsafe VVER-1000s
could result in disaster and open Western companies to liability damages.
Is MOX a Cover for a New Nuclear Bomb Factory in the U.S.? - On May 31, 2002, the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the DOE issued a news release (see DOE web site at
http://nnsa.doe.gov/docs/2002-05-31-Need_to_build_MPF.pdf ) which stated that the NNSA would
“begin conceptual design work for a facility to manufacture plutonium pits for nuclear weapons.” A “pit”
is the spherical plutonium core of a nuclear weapon and is he key component of all U.S. weapons. The
U.S. has not produced pits since the early 1990s but the Bush Administration is developing a plan for the “Modern Pit Facility” to have the capability to produce between 100-500 “war reserve pits’ per year,
basically the same levels as produced during the Cold War. A sensitive U.S. document reveals that
DOE’s Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina is the first choice for that new bomb plant. It is not
by coincidence that SRS is also the site for the plutonium storage and MOX facilities. By pursuing MOX
at SRS, DOE now has an excuse to consolidate dozens of tonnes of plutonium at the site, waiting to be
feed for the new bomb factory. If MOX fails, many in the DOE and Department of Defense will not care
as the plutonium will have been sent to one storage site with a new pit plant. Halting MOX will force
DOE to explain why it is consolidating plutonium at SRS and explain why a massive nuclear bomb
factory is needed and what the plans remain for fighting a nuclear war.
Immobilization is the cheapest, safest option - The DOE has obscured the fact that immobilization of
all 34 MT of U.S. plutonium is the cheapest option. Simply putting the plutonium back into the waste
from which it came is the most logical in concept and fairly easy to implement given the existence of an
operation high-level waste facility at SRS. DOE has claimed that it has consolidated the program into an
all-MOX option in order to save money, yet DOE’s own report to Congress of February 15, 2002 (Report
to Congress: Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at Savannah River Site) reveals MOX would cost
$3.8 billion and immobilization only $3.2. DOE has chosen to make access of this public document
difficult, but it can be found on the web at http://www.nci.org/pdf/doe-pu-2152002.pdf. The MOX
estimates may be especially unreliable, especially given that the construction costs of MOX plant and the
plant to dismantle the plutonium cores, or pits, taken from the weapons have been estimated to be more
than $1 billion each.
Given the confusion and problems that face the plutonium disposition program as now designed, Belgium
must exercise extreme caution in its involvement with the program. Any decisions taken by Belgium
concerning the manufacture of LTAs for the U.S. should be made to strengthen the disarmament, non-proliferation
and environmental aspects of weapons plutonium disposition. Thus, the only rational
decision that can be made is for Belgium to choose to not participate in the LTA program. At a
minimum, as part of an open discussion and debate, an in-depth analysis of the troubled state of affairs
with plutonium disposition in the U.S. and Russia must be conducted in advance of any decision by the
Government of Belgium. Accurate U.S. Government documents must be requested for that analysis.
Given the obstacles facing implementation of plutonium disposition, there would be no rush in
preparation of such an analysis, giving time for a comprehensive review of technical and policy details.
For more information, contact Tom Clements at Greenpeace International in Washington, D.C. on 1-
301-270-0192, tom.clements@wdc.greenpeace.org or Jan Vande Putte at Greenpeace Belgium on 32-2-
274-0213, jan.vande.putte@be.greenpeace.org.