arch/ive/ief (2000 - 2005)

While the ERT subtly masterminds its grand vision of Europe in collaboration with the European Commission, another Brussels-based European lobby group is busy implementing the less glamorous but equally critical details. Whereas the ERT is quietly proactive, UNICE is a reactive, detail-obsessed, supremely efficient lobby machine. Its working groups dissect every proposal, regulation, directive and article emerging from Brussels before spitting influential position papers back into the policy-making apparatus. Its efforts often result in the adoption of business-friendly initiatives, and more socially or environmentally progressive legislation blocked. Despite notably divergent working styles, the ERT and UNICE have a similar goal: increased industrial competitiveness in the European Union.
UNICE (the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe), has been the official voice of industry in the EU since 1958, (1) giving it a carte blanche to open, unhampered access to EU institutions. “Our mission is to influence decision-makers at the European level. Of course the word ‘lobby’ is not used, but that’s what it’s all about,” (2) confides UNICE’s communications director. “You can see UNICE as a manufacturing plant where we produce documents, and my work here in the communications department is to sell them to decision-makers”. (3) The factory image fits well with the atmosphere in UNICE’s Brussels headquarters, where piles of paper fill plain grey rooms.
This “family” of 33 employers’ federations from 25 European countries proudly speaks on behalf of “millions of small, medium and large companies”. (4) It boasts a lineage of leaders with impressive corporate credentials. Current president George Jacobs worked at the IMF before joining Belgian chemical/pharmaceutical company UCB Group, eventually becoming president of its Executive Committee. His predecessor, François Perigot, was formerly head of Unilever France and is currently a board member of the Association for Monetary Union in Europe (AMUE, see chapter 6). Current UNICE Secretary-General Dirk Hudig previously worked on EU-government relations for E RT member company ICI, and was also the European coordinator of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue’s working group on chemicals (TABD, see chapter 11).
UNICE’s detailed, micro-approach to policy-making in the EU has proven effective over the years. “There are about 19,000 experts in the Commission, and we send them our position on every possible topic which matters for b usiness ... Our Secretary-General writes to commissioners, our directors discuss with the directors of units, and our staff communicates with experts.” (5) According to former Secretary-General Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, UNICE gains regular access even to the Commission. “We are in touch. It’s a very open bureaucracy, the Commission, it is very approachable. And they feel that we can help them.” (6)
The various UNICE national federations play a special role in buttering up EU Ministers in their respective countries: “After they’ve all been approached in the same fashion, the hope is that when they get together in the Council of Ministers to make the final decision they will take account of what business has been telling them.” (7) A similar decentralised approach is used to influence Euro-parliamentarians: “If you want to influence a Spanish MEP, you would be more efficient doing it in Spanish through our Spanish federation.” (8) Still, keeping tabs on 626 MEPs as they shuttle between home, Strasbourg and Brussels is a daunting task, so UNICE works with a public relations agency to ensure the continual presence of “somebody with a UNICE hat in the Parliament”. (9) Courting the media is also important for UNICE: “If you want to make your voice heard, you have to know that politicians read newspapers, and that they are more influenced by the Financial Times than by UNICE.” (10).
Brussels Old Boys’ Network
UNICE staff regard the ERT with both admiration and complacency. “The ERT selects a few topics where it wants to be proactive— education for example, even though it is not at all on the agenda of the Commission. That’s how it works, because it is a club of persons,” explains Communications Director Christophe de Callatäy. And then, as if to justify the more pedantic, decentralised working style of UNICE versus that of the more elitist ERT, “We have no room for emotions here. UNICE is very rational, and we keep a common denominator between all federations which eventually leads to a style which is difficult to read, not attractive, and not media friendly at all.” Although the virtues of the ERT’s agenda-setting style are certainly not lost upon UNICE bureaucrats, the group holds claim to its own strengths as well. One of these is the official and thus legitimate status enjoyed by UNICE as one of the EU’s partners in the Social Dialogue. (11) “Being proactive is always a dream,” says de Callatäy, “but it would be foolish to think that you can be proactive all the time.” (12)
Despite their differences, there is much overlap between the agendas of the two lobby groups, and the president of UNICE and the ERT Secretary-General meet regularly. “On a daily basis, they are comrades. And of course we call each other when there is a problem,” says de Callatäy. (13) UNICE also networks regularly with the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce (see chapter 5), with the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue (see chapter 11) and with sectoral groups such as CEFIC, the association of the European chemical industry. “This networking is very, very important,” according to former UNICE Secretary-General Tyszkiewicz. “There may be many voices, but the important thing is that they are all carrying the same message.” (14)
This message, of industrial competitiveness in a globalised Europe, is loudly proclaimed by the larger, transnational companies headquartered in the EU member states. Smaller, less international firms benefit less from th is agenda, and thus UNICE’s relationship with UEAPME, the largest of the lobby groups representing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Europe has not been entirely smooth. UEAPME (the European Union of Craftspeop le and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) has long dreamt of being recognised as an official partner in the EU’s Social Dialogue together with the European Trade Union Confederation, the public sector employers’ union (C EEP) and UNICE.
In 1998, UEAPME threatened to take UNICE before the European Court of Justice if they were not included in the Social Dialogue, and were only persuaded to drop the case when UNICE promised to integrate their input into ev ery dialogue meeting. “They pretend that we only represent big business and not small and medium-sized companies, so we had kind of a long dispute”, admits de Callatäy. “Now UNICE’s strategy is to allow them a seat in the Social Dialogue, sitting next to UNICE, and that will allow us to represent business as a whole, which is what we want.” (15) However, UEAPME’s ‘seat’ is not an official one, and it enjoys no real rights in the Social Di alogue.
Although UNICE’s Brussels headquarters employs only about 40 staff, Tyszkiewicz claims that it can “mobilise a thousand people to help it do its work”. (16) In fact, policies and positions are elaborated through a complex web of policy committees (17) and some 60 working groups composed of experts from the various national member federations. Although it doesn’t set policy, the UNICE Secretariat plays a crucial role in setting the overall agenda: “We identify the issues, because we know the Commission’s plan of action. We know what the Parliament is doing, we know what the Council is doing, and we know what big issues are coming up. So we feed that back t o our federations.” (18) Policy papers drafted by the working groups are sent to UNICE’s Executive Committee for final approval. “Then it is our job, and the job of our federations, to spread that policy around, to talk a bout it, to explain it, to present it to the political decision-makers.” says Tyszkiewicz. (19)
UNICE’s priorities do not differ much from those of the ERT: strengthening European competitiveness, completion of the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), enlargement to the East, benchmarking and liberal isation of world trade and investment.
Benchmarking Competitiveness
UNICE has been chanting the mantra of industrial competitiveness for many years. The message in its reports on competitiveness (1994) and regulatory reforms (1995) is the same: if only public authorities would concentrate on creating a favourable climate for business, Europe would enjoy higher rates of economic growth, employment and social welfare and higher standards of living. One recent report, Benchmarking Europe’s Competitiveness: f rom Analysis to Action (20) harps further on structural and regulatory reforms. The report concludes that the gap between analysis and action in the EU is mainly due to the fact that the concept of competitiveness remains largely unexplained to the public, and proposes the benchmarking (21) of 20 basic conditions which affect business activity in Europe. These conditions cover most policy areas, from the completion of the Single Market an d the EMU to taxation. “Action is needed now, no further analysis.” (22)
Single Market and EMU
Concerning the Single Market, although quite satisfied with its progress, UNICE is still clamouring for full liberalisation of public procurement and the opening up of many services to greater competition. Simultaneously, the group complains vociferously about the introduction of new environment and health regulations which might damage industrial competitiveness.
Now that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is firmly in place, UNICE is calling for structural reforms and flexible markets so that its ‘benefits’ can be fully reaped. These reforms are meant to achieve a permanent re duction in public spending, “particularly in the areas of public consumption, pension provision and health care, welfare benefits and state subsidies”. (23) People-friendly policies are by no means a priority for UNICE. “
Try to favour business, that’s the point. This is a clear follow up of the EMU,” says de Callatäy. (24) Not surprising, then, that UNICE strongly opposes initiatives such as the one proposed by the Italian government to a llow exemptions from the Stability Pact (25) if the expenditures are on job creation. “We are for a sound public policy and sound financing, which means public deficit should be close to zero. And don’t find excuses to cr eate public deficit.” (26)
Taxes and Jobs
UNICE’s Benchmarking report also calls repeatedly for tax reduction for industry. “Tax systems should be restructured so as to promote rather than penalise enterprise and employment. In a globalised economy, illusory tax-switching solutions, such as new taxes on energy products or higher taxation on capital, should be rejected, as they would reduce European competitiveness and attractiveness as a place for investment.” (27) The ideal situ ation for UNICE, as well as for other corporate lobby groups, does not involve social and environmental policies which benefit local economies, but rather minimal corporate and labour taxes. “Taxation is a threat for busi ness. Now we are very afraid that every proposal coming up from the Commission is the coordination of fiscal measures, but only up to a certain ceiling. We would like to get to the floor.” (28)
UNICE claims that high European unemployment levels can be resolved with the creation of an ever more flexible labour market. “It has become nearly impossible to create jobs. Labour costs are so huge. It is so difficult t o fire people, so you don’t want to hire them.” (29) In line with this thinking, UNICE prefers that member states rather than the Commission deal with employment policies for fear that the latter will “go too far in setti ng goals, objectives and so on”. (30) Of course the group also strongly rejects the idea of collective bargaining at the European level. “That’s what the unions would like. Employers want to shift bargaining processes to the shop floor, to companies.” (31)
Enlargement: the Bigger the Better
The extension of the EU towards the East, with the corresponding expansion of the Single Market, is a mouth watering prospect for the various industrialists within UNICE. “The EU’s internal market will be enlarged by more than 100 million consumers with rising incomes. To catch up with the economies of the EU-15, the Central and Eastern countries need huge investment in infrastructure and production equipment. The EU-15 anticipates a trad e surplus with the applicant countries for more than the next decade,” is UNICE’s predictable line. (32)
Although happy to include as many candidates as possible in enlargement negotiations, UNICE feels sine qua non that countries must be able to implement every aspect of the Single Market legislation. Thus, it proposes para llel negotiations with the countries not included in the first round in order to reach an agreement which includes the essential elements of the Single Market. The adoption of the institutional and financial reforms discu ssed but not agreed upon at the June 1997 Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam is also of great concern to UNICE; in particular, it hopes to clarify Article 133 which covers the EU’s external commercial policy. In it s view, the Commission should gain the full competence to negotiate international agreements on services and intellectual property—otherwise, the unanimity now required for these decisions will be automatically extende d to the new members.
To smooth the accession process, UNICE has set up a task force on enlargement. Experts are assigned to each candidate country: “They go there, [and] they try on the one hand to help our federations or the business represe ntatives in these countries to adapt to the acquis communautaire, (33) and on the other hand to help the UNICE network to have a better understanding of the problems they meet and to be able to give recommendations to the Commission.” (34) Now, however, UNICE is worried about the enlargement process losing momentum: “At first you always have a lot of enthusiasm, but now people realise how big it is.” (35)
Sir Leon’s Groupies
UNICE is firmly committed to world trade and investment liberalisation, actively supporting initiatives in international fora including the World Trade Organisation (WTO, see chapter 13), the Organisation for Economic Coo peration and Development (OECD) and ongoing trans-Atlantic free trade negotiations. Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan has surely found in UNICE one of his biggest fans and a trusty ally in his free trade crusade. “UNICE has always backed Sir Leon, so whatever he comes up with, UNICE says okay, fine, do it!” (36) says de Callatäy. Yet he also bitterly complains that Brittan’s initiatives are always ultimately watered down, citing the fai lure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) negotiations at the OECD (see chapter 12) and the New Transatlantic Marketplace (see chapter 11) as examples.
UNICE has now pinned its hopes on the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) and the proposed Millennium Round in the WTO. To avoid potential stumbling blocks in the creation of the TEP, it recommends “a broad informati on campaign to win over public opinion, stressing the benefits in terms of growth, jobs, consumer health and safety, and sustainable development”. (37) UNICE has also requested that it be “fully involved in the final deci sion of the EU proposal, considering that many of the likely components of s uch an initiative have been identified jointly by European and US companies, and are the object of work in the framework of the TABD”. (38)
As for the next set of negotiations in the WTO, UNICE has made its preference clear for a round which specifically nails down agreements on international investment and intellectual property rights. Furthermore, it hopes that market access, services, agriculture, government procurement and electronic commerce are addressed, and that agreement is reached on trade measures in international environmental agreements and ecological labelling w hich does not impede liberalisation. (39)
Absolute Monsters
Civil society’s successful campaign against the MAI seems to have shaken UNICE’s complacency, and since that time the group has been attempting to integrate NGO concerns into its pro-globalisation demands. For example, UN ICE recommends that WTO negotiators secure “the widest possible endorsement by public opinion” while simultaneously “reconciling liberalisation of international trade and investment with the realisation of other objective s of general interest, such as economic development of the least-developed countries, application of internationally accepted labour standards and protection of consumers or the environment”. (40)
But at least when it comes to the environment, it is clear that these sentiments are superficial. “Absolute monsters” is how one Brussels-based environmental lobbyist describes UNICE. “Their membership is huge, and they a re present at virtually any discussion that takes place on water, chemicals, waste and so forth. They take dreadful positions on packaging, incineration and recycling, and say that they consider clean technology a joke. T hey strongly push voluntary agreements, so that environmental policy can be determined entirely by industry.” (41)
UNICE takes global conferences on environmental issues very seriously, flying a delegation of nine to Buenos Aires in November 1998 for the fourth Conference of Parties to the Climate Convention. Its position on climate c hange (see chapter 17) is business-as-usual, and in an effort to avoid any regulation which would reduce emissions, the group has been busy promoting voluntary compliance for industry. Yet at the same time, UNICE has been quick to embrace the economic opportunities implicit in the market-based solutions which industry has successfully lobbied for during the climate negotiations.
On the whole, how successful is UNICE in achieving its goals? Quite, according to Tyszkiewicz. “There are countless examples of legislation that was either avoided altogether or was quite seriously amended because of the work that UNICE does.” (42) If success can be measured by the extent to which UNICE simultaneously influences EU legislation to the advantage of its industry members and thwarts the attempts of environmental and social gr oups to place their issues on the agenda, it could be said that UNICE comes through with flying colours.

Footnotes
1. UNICE promotion leaflet.
2. Personal interview with Christophe de Callatäy, Brussels, 18 November 1998.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Personal interview with Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, Brussels, 18 March 1997.
7. Ibid.
8. Personal interview with Christophe de Callatäy, Brussels, 18 November 1998.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. The Treaty on European Union requires the European Commission to consult with management and labour, the so-called ‘social partners’. The Commission should solicit opinions or recommendations from the ‘social partners ‘ before it submits legislative proposals to the Council. The ‘social partners’ may also choose to negotiate an agreement to implement the proposal, which is then adopted at their request as a Council decision. All these processes are encompassed under the heading ‘Social Dialogue’. As of June 1999, UNICE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC are officially recognised as ‘social partners’ in the Social Dialogue.
12. Personal interview with Christophe de Callatäy, Brussels, 18 November 1998.
13. Ibid.
14. Personal interview with Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, Brussels, 18 March 1997.
15. Personal interview with Christophe de Callatäy, Brussels, 18 November 1998.
16. Personal interview with Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, Brussels, 18 March 1997.
17. Economic and Financial Affairs, External Relations, Social Affairs, Industrial Affairs and Company Affairs.
18. Personal interview with Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, Brussels, 18 March 1997).
19. Ibid.
20. UNICE, Benchmarking Europe’s Competitiveness. From Analysis to Action, Brussels, December 1997.
21. For an explanation of ‘benchmarking’, see chapter 3.
22. UNICE, Benchmarking Europe’s Competitiveness. From Analysis to Action, Brussels, December 1997.
23. Ibid.
24. Personal interview with Christophe de Callatäy, Brussels, 18 November 1998.
25. The Stability and Growth Pact is a rigid set of economic criteria put in place at the Amsterdam Summit of June 1997 in order to keep budget deficits below 1 percent of GDP in ‘normal times’ and below 3 percent during a recession after the coming into force of EMU. Countries exceeding these benchmark values face fines, but an escape clause exempts countries ‘in severe recession’, and finance ministers of the EMU countries have to vote on the imposition of such fines.
Reference: European Council, Amsterdam European Council, 16 and 17 June 1997 Presidency Conclusions, Annex I, European Council resolutions on Stability, Growth and Employment, Brussels, 17 June 1997.
26. Personal interview with Christophe de Callatäy, Brussels, 18 November 1998.
27. UNICE, Benchmarking Europe’s Competitiveness. From Analysis to Action, Brussels, December 1997.
28. Personal interview with Christophe de Callatäy, Brussels, 18 November 1998.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. UNICE position on the implications for business of EU enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries, 2 December 1997.
33. The term ‘acquis communautaire’ refers to all principles, policies, laws, practices, obligations and objectives that have been agreed or that have developed within the European Union. The ‘acquis communautaire include s’ judgements by the European Court of Justice and thereby establishes the primacy of Community law over national law.
34. Personal interview with Christophe de Callatäy, Brussels, 18 November 1998.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. UNICE, “Preliminary UNICE comments on the Commission communication concerning the creation of a New Transatlantic Marketplace”, Brussels, 23 April 1998.
38. Ibid.
39. UNICE, “Forthcoming WTO multilateral negotiations.
Preliminary UNICE objectives”, Brussels, 16 July 1998.
40. Ibid.
41. Confidential source, Brussels, 21 February 1997.
42. Personal interview with Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, Brussels, 18 March 1997.

Olivier Hoedeman
Corporate Europe Observatory
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